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Guttentag: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading

SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE AND INSIDER TRADING
Michael D. Guttentag*
Abstract
Determining when the selective disclosure of material nonpublic
information should trigger insider trading liability is a deeply problematic
aspect of insider trading doctrine.
The current rule is that a selective disclosure can only trigger insider
trading liability if “the insider [making the selective disclosure]
personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.” Dirks
v. SEC introduced this “personal benefit” test in 1983 to balance four
competing rationales for determining when a tip should trigger insider
trading liability. Two developments since Dirks have made problems
with this personal benefit test insurmountable. First, the SEC’s enactment
of Regulation Fair Disclosure in 2000 supplanted federal common law
regulation of selective disclosures by public companies and, more
pointedly, prohibited public companies from making precisely the types
of selective disclosures to Wall Street analysts that the Dirks personal
benefit test was designed to protect. Second, in United States v. O’Hagan
the Supreme Court adopted the misappropriation theory, which greatly
expanded the types of deceptive conduct that could trigger insider trading
liability.
After Regulation FD and O’Hagan, only a test for when a selective
disclosure triggers insider trading liability based directly on the statutory
prohibition against deceptive conduct makes sense. Receipt of a personal
benefit should be a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for finding that
a selective disclosure is deceptive enough to trigger insider trading
liability.
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INTRODUCTION
White collar crime tends to be a small group affair for both
psychological and operational reasons. In terms of psychology, small
groups often act in ways that go beyond limits individuals set for
themselves.1 In terms of operations, it is almost always easier to carry out
a fraud when working in cahoots with others.2
The factors that encourage small group deviance in white collar crime
generally are at work in the context of insider trading. Many, if not most,
incidents of insider trading are carried out by small groups, rather than by

1. See John M. Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious
Organizational Corruption, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1177, 1180–81 (2005); Michael D. Guttentag et
al., Brandeis’ Policeman: Results from a Laboratory Experiment on How to Prevent Corporate
Fraud, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 239, 245 (2008); Ronald R. Sims, Linking Groupthink to
Unethical Behavior in Organizations, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 651, 660 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein,
Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 75 (2000).
2. Guttentag et al., supra note 1, at 245.
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an individual acting alone.3 Therefore, insider trading often involves not
one, but two wrongs. The first is the improper selective disclosure of
material nonpublic information, and the second is the act of trading based
upon that information.4 Unfortunately, the doctrine courts use to evaluate
the legality of the first of these wrongs, the selective disclosure of
material nonpublic information, is confused and increasingly obsolete.5
3. For example, most of the insider trading prosecution and enforcement actions reported
by the SEC for the 2016 fiscal year involved small groups, rather than an individual acting alone.
SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA: FISCAL 2016 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/201703/secstats2016.pdf (stating that less than 25% of the reported insider trading cases involved
individuals acting alone). Of course, insider trading prosecution and enforcement actions may
provide a biased representation of the underlying occurrence of insider trader violations, both
because not all violations are detected and because not all detected violations are prosecuted.
4. Throughout this Article selective disclosure specifically refers to situations in which a
disclosure of material nonpublic information is made absent any specific contractual or fiduciary
obligation on the part of the recipient of the information to keep the information confidential or
to refrain from trading based on the information.
5. Surprisingly few articles in the vast literature on insider trading consider how best to
determine the wrongfulness of selectively disclosing information. In his treatise on insider trading
law, Donald Langevoort acknowledges this shortcoming, and concludes after reviewing tipper
and tippee liability in the misappropriation context that “[t]his entire subject of tipping without
specific intent to enable trading—including the place of personal benefit in all this—deserves
clarification, if not wholesale revision.” 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING
REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND PREVENTION § 6:13, Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2016)
(footnote omitted).
The most closely related literature is that which considers the practicalities of applying the
personal benefit test in various scenarios. See, e.g., Kathleen Coles, The Dilemma of the Remote
Tippee, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 181 (2005/2006); Craig W. Davis, Comment, Misappropriators, Tippees
and the Intent-to-Benefit Rule: What Can We Learn from Cady, Roberts, 35 SETON HALL L.
REV. 263 (2004); Nelson S. Ebaugh, Insider Trading Liability for Tippers and Tippees: A Call
for the Consistent Application of the Personal Benefit Test, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 265, 268 (2003);
Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation, 26
GA. L. REV. 179, 213–14 (1991); Jeffrey Plotkin, The Tipper Benefit Test Under the
Misappropriation Theory, 230 N.Y. L.J. 33 (August 15, 2003); Allison M. Vissichelli, Note, Intent
to Reconcile: SEC v. Obus, The Second Circuit’s Edification of the Tippee Scienter Standard, 62
AM. U. L. REV. 763, 767 (2013).
Recently, some of the more basic questions as to what makes selective disclosure a
manipulative or deceptive practice have finally started to receive attention in light of a circuit split
regarding what constitutes a personal benefit (discussed infra Section II.B.). See Richard A.
Epstein, Returning to Common-Law Principles of Insider Trading after United States v. Newman,
125 YALE L.J. 1482, 1485 (2016); Jonathan R. Macey, Beyond the Personal Benefit Test: The
Economics of Tipping by Insiders, 2 J.L. & PUB. AFF. 27 (2017); Donna M. Nagy, Beyond Dirks:
Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 J. CORP. L. 1, 1 (2016) [hereinafter Nagy, Beyond
Dirks]; A.C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 68 SMU L. REV. 857, 859
(2015) [hereinafter Pritchard on Dirks]; Mark Hayden Adams, Note, Insider Trading Law that
Works: Using Newman and Salman to Update Dirks’s Personal Benefit Standard, 49 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 575 (2016); Katherine Drummonds, Note, Resuscitating Dirks: How the Salman “Gift
Theory” of Tipper-Tippee Personal Benefit Would Improve Insider Trading Law, 53 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 833, 835 (2016).
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The rule that determines when a selective disclosure triggers insider
trading liability has important policy ramifications. Too lax a rule makes
it simple to circumvent the prohibition against insider trading by passing
information along among a small group of confederates.6 Too strict a rule
might criminalize legitimate efforts to share corporate information with
those outside the firm.7
Much of the challenge in identifying wrongful selective disclosure
arises because current doctrine is increasingly obsolete. What is the cause
of this obsolescence? One reason is that the prohibition against insider
trading in the United States is largely a creation of federal common law,
derived from the statutory prohibition against using a “manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance” in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security.8 It therefore falls to the federal judiciary to update rules for

6. For example, the Second Circuit in United States v. Newman dismissed the case against
defendants Anthony Chiasson and Tod Newman in part because neither defendant had knowledge
of the personal benefit, if any, received by those who first selectively disclosed the nonpublic
information. 773 F.3d 438, 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2014). For a discussion of this aspect of the Newman
holding, see Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra note 5, at 14. One implication of the holding in Newman
is that to avoid insider trading liability one could simply pass material nonpublic information
through a series of at least two tippees, without providing the person who ultimately trades
information about the motivation of the party who was the original source. See Donald C.
Langevoort, Newman and Selective Disclosure, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 28, 2015),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/01/28/newman-and-selective-disclosure/ (expressing
concern that the Newman decision reads “almost as a roadmap for selective disclosure”). See
generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, Willful Blindness, Plausible Deniability and Tippee
Liability: SACs, Steven Cohen, and the Court’s Opinion in Dirks, 15 TRANSACTIONS 47 (2013).
7. The possibility of criminal liability arises under Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act,
which also requires that the violation be knowing and willful:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter . . . or any
rule or regulation thereunder . . . shall upon conviction be fined not more than
$5,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both . . . ; but no person
shall be subject to imprisonment under this section for the violation of any rule
or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation.
15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012).
8. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act as amended provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange—
....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss2/4

4

Guttentag: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading

SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE AND INSIDER TRADING

2017]

523

determining when the selective disclosure of material nonpublic
information is sufficiently deceptive to constitute a violation of federal
securities law.9
Judges have generally looked to common law precedent to determine
what constitutes a deceptive practice in securities markets. For example,
to answer the question of when trading based on material nonpublic
information can be deceptive, the Supreme Court relied on the common
law doctrine that silence is deceptive only when one party in a transaction
owes a fiduciary duty to the other.10 However, no obvious common law
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). For a comprehensive review of this Section of the Exchange Act, see generally
Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 385 (1990) (providing a review of the events leading up to Section 10(b)’s enactment).
Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015).
With respect to the federal common law nature of insider trading jurisprudence, see, for
example, United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Dirks, and
indeed all the Supreme Court cases dealing with insider trading, have implicitly assumed that the
relevant fiduciary duty is a matter of federal common law . . . .”); A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis
F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 930
(2003) (“Powell saw Rules 10b-5’s jurisprudence as a species of ‘federal common law.’”).
9. As evidenced by the decision in Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016), the
Supreme Court has shown a decided lack of interest in carrying out such an updating in the context
of determining when a selective disclosure might trigger insider trading liability. See Michael D.
Guttentag, Salman Insider-Trading Case a Hollow Win for Prosecutors, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG
(Dec. 14, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/12/14/salman-insider-trading-case-ahollow-win-for-prosecutors/. For a discussion of the Supreme Court avoiding updating securities
regulation more generally, see Eric C. Chaffee, The Supreme Court as Museum Curator:
Securities Regulation and the Roberts Court, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 847 (2017).
10. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228, 232–33 (1980) (“But one who fails to
disclose material information prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when
he is under a duty to do so. And the duty to disclose arises when one party has information ‘that
the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and
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precedent suggests how to determine when the selective disclosure of
material nonpublic information constitutes a deceptive practice.11
Dirks v. SEC,12 the one Supreme Court case to consider at length the
relationship between selective disclosure and insider trading, might
appear to have resolved much of the uncertainty about when a selective
disclosure may trigger insider trading liability. The Court in Dirks held
that a selective disclosure by an insider will only trigger insider trading
liability if “the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from
his disclosure.”13 Most courts and scholars interpret the Dirks opinion as
resolving the question of how to determine when a selective disclosure is
wrongful.14 The Supreme Court affirmed the continuing validity of the
Dirks personal benefit test in Salman v. United States.15
But the personal benefit test, even in 1983, was an imperfect effort to
balance four different and in many ways competing rationales for
determining when a selective disclosure should trigger insider trading
liability.16 Two developments since Dirks have made problems with the
personal benefit test insurmountable.17 First, the SEC’s enactment of
Regulation Fair Disclosure in 2000 largely supplanted the federal
common law regulation of selective disclosures by public companies and,
more pointedly, prohibited public companies from making precisely the
types of selective disclosures to Wall Street analysts the Dirks personal
benefit test was designed to protect.18 Second, the adoption of the
misappropriation theory of insider trading in United States v. O’Hagan19
greatly expanded the types of deceptive conduct that might lead to insider

confidence between them.’” (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 551(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1976))).
But in grounding the insider trading prohibition in common law, the Court did not strictly
abide by any particular fiduciary duty or common law precedent. Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading
and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1337 (2009) (“From a
doctrinal perspective, the Court’s fiduciary foundation for insider trading liability under Rule 10b5 was shaky from the start.”).
11. But see Richard A. Epstein, Returning to Common-Law Principles of Insider Trading
After United States v. Newman, 125 YALE L.J. 1482, 1507 (2016) (arguing that issues related to
the wrongfulness of selective disclosure can be satisfactorily addressed by looking to common
law principles developed to prohibit the use of ill-gotten property).
12. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
13. Id. at 662.
14. E.g., Pritchard, supra note 8, at 859.
15. 137 S. Ct. 420, 427 (2016).
16. See infra Section I.A.
17. See infra Part III.
18. General Rule Regarding Selective Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2015); see infra
Section II.A.
19. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
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trading liability with important ramifications for how to identify tipper
wrongdoing.20
A reconsideration of the four justifications that originally led to the
adoption of the personal benefit test in Dirks, in light of changes wrought
by Regulation FD and O’Hagan, shows why evidence of a personal
benefit should no longer be a required element to find that a selective
disclosure is sufficiently deceptive to trigger insider trading liability.21
Fortunately, there is a better way to determine when a selective
disclosure might trigger insider trading liability. Federal courts can return
to the underlying prohibition against deceptive practices in Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act, the wellspring for the insider trading
prohibition. Based on this statute, courts could specify several different
ways—or multiple triggers—in which a selective disclosure could trigger
insider trading liability.22
Directly linking the question of when a selective disclosure is
wrongful to the statutory prohibition against deceptive conduct obviates
the need to contort a personal benefit test to address an insider trading
landscape that has significantly changed since the 1983 Dirks decision.
I. UNBUNDLING DIRKS
A careful reading of the Dirks decision is a useful starting point for
evaluating how courts should determine when a selective disclosure
should trigger insider trading liability. More specifically, identifying the
justifications for the Court’s adoption of the personal benefit test in Dirks
is helpful in three ways. First, identifying these various, often competing,
justifications helps to explain the Dirks opinion’s differing descriptions
as to what constitutes an impermissible personal benefit. Second,
identifying these various justifications clarifies the reasons for the
differences between the Second Circuit opinion in United States v.
Newman and the Ninth Circuit opinion in United States v. Salman about
what constitutes a personal benefit, as well as elucidating the reasons for
the disagreement between the majority and dissent opinions in United
States v Martoma.23 Finally, identifying and separating out these various
justifications suggests how best to update the Dirks precedent to reflect
changes in securities markets disclosure practices and insider trading
law.24

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 665 (applying the misappropriation theory); see infra Section II.B.
See infra Section III.A.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); see infra Part IV.
See infra Section I.B.
See infra Part IV.
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A. Justifications for a Personal Benefit Test
One of the central questions addressed in Dirks is when a selective
disclosure of material nonpublic information may trigger insider trading
liability.25 The Dirks majority opinion introduced a new test to assist in
making this determination. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., in the majority
opinion in Dirks, writes that a selective disclosure can only be sufficiently
wrongful to trigger insider trading liability if “the insider personally will
benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.”26
This Section will show that the reasons offered in Dirks for adopting
a personal benefit test are more complex than is generally recognized.27
Specifically, four distinct justifications for adopting the personal benefit
test appear at various points in the Dirks opinion. These are: (1) that
requiring proof of a personal benefit establishes objective criteria, (2) that
a personal benefit test allows company executives to continue to make
selective disclosures for legitimate business purposes, (3) that receipt of
a personal benefit shows that the person making the selective disclosure
(the “tipper”) was attempting to circumvent the prohibition against
insider trading, and (4) that receipt of a personal benefit is a required
element for finding either that a deception or a fiduciary duty breach has
occurred.
In the discussion that follows regarding how the Dirks opinion
develops each of these justifications for introducing a personal benefit
test, consideration is given to how well each of these justifications: (1)
addresses the statutory goal of prohibiting deceptive conduct, and (2)
matches up with the specifics of the personal benefit test enunciated in
Dirks.28
25. For an identification and discussion of the three distinct legal issues addressed and
holdings provided in Dirks, see infra Subsection III.B.2.
26. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).
27. A few of the notable exceptions are Epstein, supra note 11, at 1504–10, and Macey,
supra note 5.
28. This Article presupposes that Dirks unequivocally holds that the existence of a personal
benefit is the exclusive basis on which a selective disclosure can be wrongful. Some of the best
evidence that the Court intends the personal benefit to be a necessary element comes from the
abbreviation used when specifying the content of the personal benefit test. In discussing the
personal benefit test, the opinion states, “This requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i.e.,
whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a
pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.” Dirks, 463 U.S.
at 663. The opinion uses the abbreviation i.e. rather than e.g., implying that only these specific
types of evidence will suffice. Id.
However, one could question this assumption. For example, in several places the opinion
refers to the operative test as being based on whether there was a fiduciary duty breach and not
exclusively on whether there was a personal benefit. For example, the Dirks opinion emphasizes
the centrality of evidence of a fiduciary breach in favorably citing Chiarella for the precedent that
“[t]he tippee’s obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after the fact in
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1. Objective Criteria
One justification Dirks offers for requiring a personal benefit element
to find tipper wrongdoing is that such a requirement guarantees that
judges and prosecutors can “focus on objective criteria.”29 The Dirks
opinion notes that relying on objective criteria means that “[i]n
determining whether the insider’s purpose in making a particular
disclosure is fraudulent, the SEC and the courts are not required to read
the parties’ minds.”30
We know from Professor Adam Pritchard’s review of Justice Powell’s
personal records, which include earlier drafts of the Dirks opinion and
correspondence between the Justices regarding the Dirks decision, that
using the personal benefit test to shift the analysis toward questions
involving objective criteria was the product of a compromise between
Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Powell.31 Pritchard reports that the
personal benefit test was introduced into the final versions of the Dirks
opinion at the suggestion of Justice O’Connor.32 Justice O’Connor was
concerned about the subjectivity involved in trying to determine the
purpose for which a selective disclosure was made, which Powell’s
earlier drafts of the Dirks opinion had relied upon as the exclusive means
to decide when a selective disclosure might trigger insider trading
liability.33
Pritchard summarized the story of how Justice O’Connor’s concern
led to the personal benefit test in a 2003 Duke Law Review article:
Justice O’Connor’s second concern was more substantial.
She worried that focusing on the insider’s purpose in
disclosing the information would require “the factfinder . . . to determine the subjective state of mind of the
the insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty.” Id. at 659 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 230 n.12 (1980) (alteration in original)).
29. Id. at 663.
30. Id. Although not explicitly mentioned in the Dirks opinion, Langevoort observes that
the personal benefit test can also provide objective criteria that the recipient of the information
(the tippee) can observe. Langevoort writes that “the personal benefit requirement is imposed
because it provides an objective test for determining whether there has been the requisite notice
to the tippee.” 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 5, § 4:3 n.7.
31. See Pritchard on Dirks, supra note 5, at 866; Pritchard, supra note 8, at 942. For the
personal records of Justice Powell, now available online, see Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, WASH.
& LEE SCH. L., http://law2.wlu.edu/powellarchives/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2016).
For a discussion of the questionable value of judicial history generally, see Adrian Vermeule,
Judicial History, 108 YALE L.J. 1311, 1314 (1999) (“Nonetheless, that courts have at some times
and under some circumstances consulted internal materials across all of these domains throws the
puzzling exclusion of internal judicial history into sharp relief.” (footnote omitted)).
32. Pritchard, supra note 8, at 941–42.
33. Pritchard on Dirks, supra note 5, at 865–68.
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insider,” “an inherently difficult determination.” She
suggested omitting the discussion of purpose, a change that
Powell was not willing to make. More promising was her
proposed alternative, which looked to
“whether the insider derives a direct or indirect
benefit from his disclosure, and that benefit is
primarily of a pecuniary nature. An emphasis on
benefit differs from your approach only insofar as
it establishes a more objective indicia of liability.
. . .”
. . . The opinion accordingly was revised to reflect Justice
O’Connor’s “quite constructive” suggestions.34
There are advantages and disadvantages to using objective criteria,
such as evidence of a personal benefit, to determine when a selective
disclosure is a deceptive practice. One advantage, as the correspondence
between Justices O’Connor and Powell highlights, is that objective
criteria remove some of the uncertainty that might otherwise surround a
determination of whether a selective disclosure was made for an
inappropriate purpose.35
There are several disadvantages of using a test based on objective
criteria to determine when a selective disclosure involves deceptive
conduct. First, as with any test based on an extrapolation from statutory
language, there is the likelihood of a mismatch between the objective
criteria and the underlying language. Take, for example, a selective
disclosure made for a personal benefit that was nevertheless sanctioned
by the firm. In this situation, there would be evidence of a personal benefit
from the selective disclosure, but no underlying deceptive conduct.36
Second, requiring evidence of objective criteria may also be
underinclusive, because of situations in which a selective disclosure
constitutes the kind of deceptive practice that federal securities statutes
prohibit, but where there is no objective evidence of a personal benefit.37
As Pritchard observes, “[t]hese changes narrowed the scope of improper

34. Pritchard, supra note 8, at 941–42 (footnotes omitted). In a more recent article, Pritchard
published more of the details of the correspondence between Justices O’Connor and Powell
regarding the inclusion of the personal benefit test in the Dirks opinion. Pritchard on Dirks, supra
note 5, at 866–67.
35. Pritchard on Dirks, supra note 5, at 865–66.
36. The possibility of firm-sanctioned selective disclosure raises the more general question
of why insider trading is illegal when sanctioned by the firm. See, e.g., John P. Anderson, What’s
the Harm in Issuer-Licensed Insider Trading?, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 795, 801 (2015).
37. For two specific examples of this under-inclusiveness, see infra Section IV.A.
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purposes that the SEC could argue constituted breaches of fiduciary duty
under Rule 10b-5.”38
The objective criteria justification for adopting the personal benefit
test also explains some but not all of the description of what constitutes a
personal benefit in Dirks. For example, the opinion describes the test as
including either a “direct or indirect personal benefit” and provides as
examples “pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into
future earnings.”39 Including the word “indirect” in this sentence could
raise questions about how attenuated acceptable evidence of objective
criteria can be, and the ways in which a reputational benefit might
translate into future earnings are certainly not as easy to objectively
ascertain as the pecuniary gain test originally proposed by Justice
O’Connor. Similarly, the Court notes that “a gift of confidential
information to a trading relative or friend” could also evince a personal
benefit, which further strains an effort to delineate strictly objective
criteria for identifying an improper purpose, because issues might arise
about who counts as a friend or relative.40
The desire to focus on objective criteria, despite its centrality in the
judicial history of the Dirks opinion, is but one of several justifications
for introducing evidence of a personal benefit test as a necessary element
of wrongful selective disclosure.
2. Policy Concerns
A second justification in the Dirks opinion for requiring evidence of a
personal benefit is that doing so establishes a test that allows firms to
continue to make selective disclosures for legitimate business purposes.41
This second justification, which is a policy consideration aimed at
protecting the ability of public firms to disseminate information in a
reasonable and, at times, selective manner, appears twice in the Dirks
opinion. First, the opinion states that “[i]mposing a duty to disclose or
abstain solely because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic
information from an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting
38. Pritchard, supra note 8, at 942.
39. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983). For the original language Justice O’Connor
offered in an effort to make the test more objective, see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
Justice O’Connor’s original suggestion did include the word “indirect” but also focused on the
benefit being “primarily of a pecuniary nature.” See supra text accompanying note 34.
40. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. For a discussion of the possibility of ambiguity about the
meaning of these terms, see Brief of the NYU Center on the Administration of Criminal Law as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 10–12, Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420
(2016) (No. 15-628); Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra note 5, at 30 (citing to a SEC report, which found
that the Court’s opinion in Bateman Eicher clarified “some of the principles underlying Dirks and
‘removing certain potential ambiguities’”).
41. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663.
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influence on the role of market analysts.”42 Later, Justice Powell writes
that the Court’s failure to establish a clear test for market participants as
to when a selective disclosure might trigger insider trading liability
“could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which
the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy
market.”43 In 1983, the Court could also write with some certainty that
“[i]t is the nature of this type of information, and indeed of the markets
themselves, that such information cannot be made simultaneously
available to all of the corporation’s stockholders or the public
generally.”44
Weighing the policy ramifications of adopting a particular standard to
identify wrongdoing is not unusual for the judiciary when undertaking
statutory interpretation, even if courts might prefer deference to the other
branches of government when these kinds of policy determinations need
to be made.45 Moreover, it is particularly apt for a court to weigh the
policy implications of its decisions when applying the federal securities
statutes to the insider trading prohibition for two reasons. First, this is an
area of the law where the underlying statutory language is quite broad. 46
Second, Congress has repeatedly indicated its desire to delegate to federal
courts the task of filling in the details of when insider trading constitutes
the type of manipulative or deceptive practice prohibited by the federal
securities statutes.47 However, there are also a multitude of challenges
that courts face in making these kinds of policy determinations.48
3. Prevent Circumvention
A third justification in Dirks for adopting a personal benefit test is that
such a test is necessary to prevent insiders from circumventing the
42. Id. at 658.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 659.
45. But see Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision
Making, 98 IOWA L. REV. 465, 468 (2013) (“The Supreme Court’s deference determinations in a
wide range of constitutional contexts are often inchoate and under-theorized.”).
46. See supra note 8.
47. For a review of this aspect of the Stock Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK)
Act of 2012, see Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra note 5, at 34–35. For a review of this aspect of the
1984 Insider Trading Sanctions Act and the 1988 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act, see Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra note 5, at 27–33; Nagy, supra note 10, at 1366–
68; Richard W. Painter et al., Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v.
O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153, 200–03 (1998); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading
Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU
L. REV. 1589, 1616–18 (1999) (providing that “under Central Bank, . . . the courts must infer how
the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issue if Rule 10b-5 had been included as an express
provision of the 1934 Act”).
48. See infra Subsection III.A.2.
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prohibition against insider trading by indirectly benefiting from activities
they may not carry out directly.49 In the simplest example, without an
anti-circumvention prohibition, rather than trade based on inside
information, an insider could simply sell selective access to material
nonpublic information and reap a pecuniary gain without actually
engaging in insider trading.50
In raising this concern, Justice Powell writes in the Dirks majority
opinion:
The need for a ban on some tippee trading is clear. Not only
are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from
personally using undisclosed corporate information to their
advantage, but they also may not give such information to an
outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the
information for their personal gain.51
In further support of this anti-circumvention justification for a
personal benefit test, Justice Powell cites Section 20(b) of the Exchange
Act, which makes “it unlawful to do indirectly ‘by means of any other
person’ any act made unlawful by the federal securities laws.”52
There are two ways to implement the anti-circumvention justification
for requiring evidence of a personal benefit. One could implement this
anti-circumvention goal in a narrow way. A narrow implementation
would prohibit someone making a selective disclosure from receiving
money from the sale of selective access to material nonpublic
information. The Dirks opinion offers as a justification for this narrow
implementation Professor Victor Brudney’s observation “that the insider,
by giving the information out selectively, is in effect selling the
information to its recipient for cash, reciprocal information, or other
things of value for himself.”53
49. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659, 662.
50. See generally Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, Making a Market for
Corporate Disclosure 12 (Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
769, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2814125 (arguing that firms should be able to sell the right
to receive selective disclosures of material nonpublic information: “many firms may in reality be
fine with allowing their insiders to earn trading profits based on the firm’s information––meaning
that they are unlikely to police themselves”).
51. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659.
52. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b) (1976)). This anti-circumvention justification for some
kind of anti-tipping rule also appears in a discussion in Dirks regarding the SEC opinion Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). Id. at 654. The Dirks opinion notes that “[t]ipping thus
properly is viewed only as a means of indirectly violating the Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain
rule.” Id. at 661.
53. Id. at 664 (emphasis added) (citing Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and
Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 348
(1979)).
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This narrow implementation of the anti-circumvention objective is
consistent with the Court’s description of the personal benefit test as
involving a determination of “whether the insider receives a direct or
indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or
a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.”54
An alternative, broader implementation of the anti-circumvention
objective would prohibit not only selling information, but also providing
information instead of cash or some other good to a third party. One might
characterize this as a prohibition on improperly “spending” the benefits
from insider trading. In this broader implementation there need not be
any cash or cash-equivalent coming back to the tipper; the tipper may
receive a benefit from giving the information where she might have
achieved a similar result by “spending” cash.55
This broader implementation of the anti-circumvention rationale
animates at least some of the Court’s formulation of what constitutes a
personal benefit in Dirks. For example, this broader implementation
explains why a personal benefit arises “when an insider makes a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative or friend. The tip and trade
resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits
to the recipient.”56 In this situation, rather than generating cash from
insider trading and using the proceeds, the wrongdoer simply provides
valuable information in lieu of cash. The end result is the same but
without the tipper having to buy or sell shares.
It is noteworthy that while the broader implementation of the anticircumvention goal explains why “a gift of confidential information to a
trading relative or friend”57 could constitute a personal benefit, it is not
self-evident why the broader implementation of the anti-circumvention
goal should only prohibit tips to these particular people.58
54. Id. at 663. It should be noted that the Dirks opinion explains this example not as an anticircumvention measure, but as a breach of a fiduciary duty. For a discussion of this aspect of the
justifications for the personal benefit test, see infra Subsection III.A.4. Also, this narrower
perspective on the personal benefit test is consistent with Justice O’Connor’s suggested language
for such a test in her correspondence with Justice Powell, stating that the issue should be whether
“that benefit is primarily of a pecuniary nature.” See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
55. Concern about this broader type of anti-circumvention was mentioned in the Salman
opinion where Justice Samuel Alito observed: “Making a gift of inside information to a relative
like Michael is little different from trading on the information, obtaining the profits, and doling
them out to the trading relative.” Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016).
56. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. Note that by including this sentence the opinion appears to
accept this broader perspective on the anti-circumvention goal, despite the fact that Justice
O’Connor’s proposed language with respect to the personal benefit test only appears to embrace
the narrower perspective. See supra note 54.
57. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664.
58. The Court limits the broader implementation of the anti-circumvention goal without
explanation. Perhaps the Court is implicitly relying on the doctrine in corporate law which treats
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Whether the personal benefit test is the best way to either narrowly
(by prohibiting “selling” selective access to material nonpublic
information) or broadly (by prohibiting “spending” selective access to
material nonpublic information) prevent circumvention of the insider
trading prohibition is less clear. One problem with a narrow
implementation is that such a rule would not treat giving valuable inside
information to friends and family as a securities law violation, so long as
no cash remuneration was received in exchange, regardless of whether
deception occurred. On the other hand, a broad implementation of the
anti-circumvention goal might outlaw efforts to circumvent the
prohibition against insider trading, but could render the personal benefit
test a “nullity.”59 This is because, at the extreme, evidence of a personal
benefit could be deduced simply from the fact that a person chose to make
a selective disclosure at all. Even a gift of information to an absolute
stranger could provide the donor a personal benefit under the broad anticircumvention justification, if the tipper might otherwise have given that
stranger cash that was generated from insider trading.60
If the goal is to prevent circumvention, then the better approach would
be to simply follow the common law rule that prohibits any gifting or
personal use of another’s chattel or land. Professor Richard Epstein
summarizes the relevant doctrine as follows: “no person is allowed to
make gifts to his friends of property that is owned by another,”61 and
argues that the source of this rule can be found in Roman Law, which
held “that any knowingly unauthorized use of a chattel constituted a form
of theft.”62 Under such a rule any selective disclosure without consent
would be prohibited regardless of whether there is evidence that the donor
received a personal benefit. If the goal is solely to prevent circumvention,
then there would seem to be no need to check for personal benefit.
4. Element of a Fraud or a Fiduciary Breach
A fourth justification for the personal benefit test in Dirks links
evidence of a personal benefit directly to the fraud prohibition in the
certain transactions, such as those between the firm and certain relatives of the firm’s directors,
as requiring heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2016); MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 8.60 (2010).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014).
60. This difficulty was a concern raised by the dissent in Dirks. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 676 n.13
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun wrote: “The distinction between pure altruism and
self-interest has puzzled philosophers for centuries; there is no reason to believe that courts and
administrative law judges will have an easier time with it.” Id.
61. Epstein, supra note 11, at 1507.
62. Id. at 1501. Epstein goes on to make the observation that he does not see why the “the
analysis ought to change when what passes between parties is not property but information.” Id.
at 1507.
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statute. Sprinkled throughout the Dirks opinion, there are quotes drawn
from earlier insider trading cases that suggest that the presence of a
personal benefit is a necessary element for finding that insider trading is
fraudulent.
For example, the opinion in Dirks includes quotations from two of the
seminal SEC insider trading opinions, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc.63 and Cady, Roberts & Co.,64 suggesting that receipt of a
personal benefit is at the heart of the insider trading prohibition.65 In fact,
the phrase “personal benefit” first appears in Dirks in a quote from the
1968 SEC Merrill Lynch decision: “In an insider-trading case this fraud
derives from the ‘inherent unfairness involved where one takes
advantage’ of ‘information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.’”66
The Cady, Roberts quotation similarly emphasizes the importance of
personal gain in making insider trading fraudulent: “[A]n insider will be
liable under Rule 10b–5 for inside trading only where he fails to disclose
material nonpublic information before trading on it and thus makes
‘secret profits.’”67 Cady, Roberts also appears in a footnote in Dirks to
support the proposition that “[a] significant purpose of the Exchange Act
was to eliminate the idea that use of inside information for personal
advantage was a normal emolument of corporate office.”68
Logically, if a personal benefit is a necessary element to trigger the
prohibition against insider trading generally, then receipt of a personal
benefit in exchange for a selective disclosure is fraudulent for the same
reason that insider trading itself is fraudulent. In this respect, the Court’s
favorable citation of an article by Professor Michael Dooley for the
proposition that “inside trading for personal gain is fraudulent, and is a
violation of the federal securities laws” is highly suggestive.69
However, it would require a misreading of the cited insider trading
decisions to conclude that the fraudulent nature of insider trading is solely
the result of an insider personally benefiting from the use of material
nonpublic information. For example, in the Merrill Lynch decision cited
63. 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968).
64. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
65. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654.
66. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Merrill Lynch, 43 S.E.C. at 936).
67. Id. (quoting Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 916 n.31).
68. Id. at 653 n.10 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Cady, Roberts, 40
S.E.C. at 912 n.15). It is interesting to observe that even here the Dirks opinion is not claiming
that deterring personal benefits is the only purpose served by the securities laws. Id. The Court
writes that this objective was “a” significant purpose, not “the” significant purpose of federal
securities statutes. Id.
69. Id. at 667 n.27 (emphasis added) (citing Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider
Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 39–41, 70 (1980)).
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in Dirks, the SEC held that facilitating unequal access to material
nonpublic information, and not the existence of a personal benefit, made
selective disclosure of information a violation of federal securities
statutes.70 And in Chiarella v. United States,71 decided just three years
before Dirks, the Supreme Court held that the deception involved in
insider trading arises from a breach of fiduciary duty, and did not identify
a personal benefit as a required element in that context.72
Closely related to the claim that the receipt of a personal benefit makes
selective disclosure deceptive is the argument that evidence of a personal
benefit is evidence that there was a breach of a fiduciary duty. Then, in
turn, following the logic of Chiarella, it is this fiduciary duty breach that
creates the insider trading violation. Several places in the Dirks opinion
treat evidence of a personal benefit and of a fiduciary duty breach as
synonymous. For example, the quote that precedes the introduction of the
personal benefit test reads: “But to determine whether the disclosure itself
‘deceive[s], manipulate[s], or defraud[s]’ shareholders, the initial inquiry
is whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider.”73 Elsewhere,
the Dirks opinion cites Chiarella for the holding that “[t]he tippee’s
obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after
the fact in the insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty.” 74 Finally, Dirks
favorably cites Chiarella for the proposition that a breach of fiduciary
duty is the main element of an insider trading violation, noting that in
“determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to disclose or
abstain, it thus is necessary to determine whether the insider’s ‘tip’
constituted a breach of the insider’s fiduciary duty.”75
But there are problems with treating evidence of a personal benefit as
synonymous with a breach of a fiduciary duty and therefore a deceptive
act. First, there is the doctrinal issue raised in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green76 that even if a personal benefit were synonymous with a fiduciary
70. Merrill Lynch, 43 S.E.C. at 935 (“The advance disclosure of such information to a select
group who could utilize it for their own benefit, and to the detriment of public investors to whom
the information was not known, constituted an act, practice, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon such investors.”).
71. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
72. Id. at 228. One could argue that the Chiarella opinion did not need to mention the
existence of a personal benefit, since it was a self-evident feature of the insider trading involved
in that case.
73. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Aaron v. SEC,
446 U.S. 680, 686 (1980)).
74. Id. at 659 (alteration in original) (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12). Similarly,
the Court in Dirks observes that “a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholder of a
corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his
fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee.” Id. at 660.
75. Id. at 661.
76. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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duty breach, it is not necessarily true that every fiduciary duty breach
involves the type of deception that is prohibited by the federal securities
statutes.77 Presumably, the implicit argument is that a personal benefit
reveals a breach of the duty of loyalty, and that a breach of the duty of
loyalty involves “feigned fidelity” and an act of deception.78 But, as
Professor Stephen Bainbridge nicely observes, “The question thus arises
as to which of the various duties to which corporate insiders are subject
is the relevant one in this context. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court once
again was not very precise on this score.”79
Perhaps some legitimate basis can be developed for defining when a
fiduciary breach is deceptive, but there will likely remain some mismatch
between these criteria and a personal benefit test. As Professor Donald
Langevoort observes, “If there is one thing clear about the common law
of fiduciary responsibility, it is that ‘intent to benefit’ is not an essential
element of a case against the fiduciary.”80
Differences between a personal benefit and a fiduciary duty breach
were already clear when Dirks was decided. Justice Harry Blackmun in
his dissent in Dirks highlights this point with an example from Mosser v.
Darrow,81 a case also cited by the majority in Dirks.82 Blackmun observes
that in Mosser the Court did not require a showing of a personal benefit
received by a fiduciary (nor was there evidence of such a benefit), and
yet the Court still reached the conclusion that there was not only a breach
77. Id. at 474–76.
78. This link between a personal benefit test and a duty of loyalty is one of the explanations
Langevoort provides for the Court’s adoption of the personal benefit test in Dirks:
Tipping occurs when an insider passes on information which he knows is
material and nonpublic to an outsider, in violation of a fiduciary duty to the
issuer. . . . But by superimposing the personal benefit requirement, the Dirks
Court seemingly limited the class of breaches that bring into play the abstain or
disclose requirement to those that are essentially breaches of the “duty of
loyalty” . . . rather than the “duty of care.”
18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 5, § 4:6.
Nagy also endorses making the link between a breach of the duty of loyalty and the deceptive
conduct involved in making a selective disclosure explicit, writing: “The Salman Court now has
the opportunity to advance the law even further by holding explicitly that breaches of loyalty in
connection with securities trading trigger for tippers a Rule 10b-5 disclosure obligation . . . .”
Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra note 5, at 51.
79. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW AND POLICY 50–51 (2014). For
example, the common law rule that silence by a fiduciary is a deceptive act does not require
evidence of a personal benefit to reach the conclusion that such silence is deceptive. See Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 228.
80. 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 5, § 4:5.
81. 341 U.S. 267 (1951).
82. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983).
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of a fiduciary duty, but specifically a breach of the duty of loyalty.83
There are four different justifications the Supreme Court offered when
it held in Dirks that a selective disclosure by an insider will only trigger
insider trading liability if “the insider personally will benefit, directly or
indirectly, from his disclosure.”84 These four distinct justifications match
somewhat imperfectly with the statutory prohibition against deceptive
conduct, the personal benefit test enunciated in Dirks, and even with each
other.
B. Newman, Salman, and Martoma
Unbundling the Dirks opinion’s justifications for requiring evidence
of a personal benefit to find tipper wrongdoing does much to explain
differences between the Second Circuit’s application of the personal
benefit test in United States v. Newman85 and the Ninth Circuit’s
application of the same test in Salman.86 Understanding the competing
justifications for adopting the personal benefit test in Dirks also
illuminates the reasons for the sharp disagreement between the majority
and dissent in United States v. Martoma87 in determining whether Salman
justified reconsidering the Newman precedent. These various differences
arise in large part from an unstated disagreement about which of the four
justifications offered in Dirks for adopting the personal benefit test should
be paramount.88 In its brief affirmation of the Salman decision, the
Supreme Court did nothing to resolve the tensions between these four
rationales for adopting the personal benefit test.89
The Newman case involved situations in which an inside source
passed along selectively disclosed information through several
intermediaries until the defendants, Anthony Chiasson and Todd
Newman, used the information to trade for a profit.90 In reversing the
convictions in Newman, the Second Circuit held that to convict a tippee
there must be evidence of “a meaningfully close personal relationship that
generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at
least a potential gain [to the tipper] of a pecuniary or similarly valuable
83. Id. at 675.
84. Id. at 662.
85. 773 F.3d 438, 442, 448 (2d Cir. 2014).
86. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2015).
87. 869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017).
88. But see John C. Coffee, Jr., News from California: The 9th Circuit and the SEC
Challenge New York, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (July 20, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/
2015/07/20/news-from-california-the-9th-circuit-and-the-sec-challenge-new-york/ (“In my
humble judgment, most (but possibly not all) Second Circuit panels would have reached the same
outcome as did the Ninth Circuit in Salman . . . .”).
89. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). The opinion is only seven pages long.
90. Newman, 773 F.3d at 443.
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nature.”91 Only under these circumstances, according to the Newman
panel, can a selective disclosure be equivalent to “trading by the insider
himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.”92 The Second
Circuit opinion in Newman relies primarily on the role the personal
benefit test can play in providing objective criteria for determining when
a selective disclosure is wrongful.93
The Newman court, in its effort to ensure that judges and prosecutors
can rely on objective criteria, is unwilling to accept an interpretation of
the personal benefit test that edges away from a focus on objective
evidence.94 In a recent article, Pritchard argues that the interpretation of
the personal benefit test by the Newman panel correctly interprets the
Dirks personal benefit test.95 But Pritchard’s reading of the Dirks
precedent may be unduly influenced by his familiarity with the judicial
history surrounding the inclusion of the personal benefit test in Dirks. As
Pritchard first uncovered, the personal benefit test was included in the
final drafts of the Dirks opinion to address Justice O’Connor’s concern
about the lack of objective criteria for determining when a selective
disclosure is wrongful.96 But, as discussed above, the evidence in its
entirety does not support the conclusion that establishing objective
criteria was the sole reason for the adoption of the personal benefit

91. Id. at 452.
92. Id. (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983)).
93. This focus on the objective criteria justification is evident from the sections of the Dirks
opinion that the Second Circuit opinion in Newman chooses to cite. See, e.g., Newman, 773 F.3d
at 450 (“But a breach of the duty of confidentiality is not fraudulent unless the tipper acts for
personal benefit, that is to say, there is no breach unless the tipper ‘is in effect selling the
information to its recipient for cash, reciprocal information, or other things of value for
himself . . . .’” (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664)).
Conversely, the Second Circuit opinion in Newman does not cite the language in the Dirks
opinion characterizing the personal benefit test in ways more influenced by alternative
justifications, such as the statement that wrongful selective disclosure occurs when an insider
makes a “gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.” Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664.
94. Newman, 773 F.3d at 451–53.
95. Pritchard on Dirks, supra note 5, at 874 (“Newman’s interpretation of personal benefit
is consistent with, if not compelled by, Powell’s purpose in Dirks.”); see also Stephen Bainbridge,
US v. Newman: A Big Win for Coherence and Fairness in Insider Trading Law,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Dec. 11, 2014, 12:49 PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/
professorbainbridgecom/2014/12/us-v-newman-a-big-win-for-coherence-and-fairness-ininsider-trading-law.html (“Yesterday, the Second Circuit did the right thing and reversed the
convictions . . . .”); Coffee, supra note 87 (“Understandably, the Second Circuit found this
professional courtesy to be insufficient to amount to the requisite ‘personal benefit.’”). But see
Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra note 5, at 6 (“My own views coincide with those of scholars including
Professors Michael Perino, Jay Brown, and James Cox, who each regard Newman as a blatant
misapplication of Dirks . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
96. See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.
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requirement.97
In the Salman case, investment banker Maher Kara repeatedly passed
confidential information garnered through his position at Citigroup to his
brother, Michael Kara, who, in turn, passed the information along to
Bassam Salman, who traded using this information.98 The Ninth Circuit
Salman opinion emphasizes the statement in Dirks that the “exploitation
of nonpublic information also exist[s] when an insider makes a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative or friend.”99 For the Ninth
Circuit in Salman, therefore, it is a simple matter to conclude that passing
information from one brother to another created a personal benefit for the
tipper, in this case Maher, even without evidence of “a potential gain of
a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”100 As discussed above, the
source of the presumption of a personal benefit when a gift is made to a
“trading friend or relative” was concern about using a tip to circumvent
the insider trading prohibition.101
Thus, it is ambiguity in Dirks about why to require evidence of a
personal benefit—and the differing characterizations throughout the
Dirks opinion as to what constitutes a personal benefit—that best explains
the Circuit split regarding what is needed to establish receipt of a personal
benefit.102 The Newman panel focuses on the language in the Dirks
opinion emphasizing the importance of establishing objective criteria,103
while the Salman panel focuses on language in the Dirks opinion
preventing tip use to circumvent the insider trading prohibition.104

97. See supra Section I.A. For example, it is hard to reconcile the Newman panel’s
statement of the personal benefit test requiring “a meaningfully close personal relationship that
generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain [to
the tipper] of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature,” Newman, 773 F.3d at 452, with the
statement in Dirks that a personal benefit results “when an insider makes a gift of confidential
information to a trading relative or friend.” Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664.
98. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2015).
99. Id. at 1092 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664).
100. Id. at 1093 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 452). The Ninth Circuit
Salman opinion also notes the holding in Newman that evidence of a personal benefit requires
finding a “meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective,
consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature,”
and concludes that “[t]o the extent Newman can be read to go so far, we decline to follow it.” Id.
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 452).
101. See supra Subsection I.A.3.
102. For a prescient discussion of uncertainty about what might constitute a sufficient
personal benefit to trigger liability under Dirks, see Donald C. Langevoort, The Demise of Dirks:
Shifting Standards for Tipper-Tippee Liability, INSIGHTS, June 1994, at 23, 24.
103. See supra Subsection I.A.1.
104. See supra Subsection I.A.3.
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In affirming Salman and rejecting at least part of Newman, the
Supreme Court did little to resolve this ambiguity in Dirks.105 The
Supreme Court opinion did recognize the anti-circumvention goal of
prohibiting gifts to friends or relative, observing that: “In such situations,
the tipper benefits personally because giving a gift of trading information
is the same thing as trading by the tipper followed by a gift of the
proceeds.”106 But the larger tensions inherent in the personal benefit test
were entirely ignored. This unwillingness in the Supreme Court’s Salman
opinion to address doctrinal confusion regarding the link between
selective disclosure and the insider trading prohibition is problematic
given how much has changed in the regulation of selective disclosure and
insider trading since Dirks was decided.
The Martoma case involved an appeal from an insider trading
conviction entered in September 2014.107 In the original case the
defendant, Mathew Martoma, was convicted based on a claim that he was
a tippee who knew that the tipper, Dr. Sidney Gilman, from whom he
received material nonpublic information, received a personal benefit in
exchange for providing the information. Martoma’s appeal of that
conviction was initially based on the holding in Newman and then was
reheard to address the Supreme Court subsequent decision in Salman.
The majority in Martoma upheld the original insider trading
conviction. In doing so, the majority held “that Salman fundamentally
altered the analysis underlying Newman’s ‘meaningfully close personal
relationship’ requirement such that the ‘meaningfully close personal
relationship’ requirement is no longer good law.”108 To reach this
conclusion, the majority in Martoma repeatedly noted and observed that
the Salman opinion specifically mentioned the extent which “making a
gift of insider information to a relative . . . is little different from trading
on the information, obtaining the profits, and doling them out.”109 The
Martoma court’s rejection of Newman was almost exclusively based on
its acceptance of preventing circumvention as the primary and seemingly
exclusive goal of the personal benefit test in Dirks.110

105. In the Salman opinion, the Supreme Court specifically rejects the Newman panel’s
statement of the personal benefit test as requiring “a meaningfully close personal relationship that
generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain [to
the tipper] of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.” Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420,
428 (2016) (quoting United States v. Newman, 773 F. 3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014)).
106. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428.
107. United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 2017).
108. Id. at 69.
109. Id. at 69 (quoting Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428).
110. See supra Subsection I.A.3. for a discussion of the goal of preventing circumvention of
the insider trading prohibition as a justification for the Dirks’ personal benefit test.
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On the other hand, the dissent in Martoma emphasizes other
justifications that appear in Dirks for adopting a personal benefit test, and
in doing so reaches the opposite conclusion about whether the Newman
precedent should be reversed based on the holding in Salman. The dissent
in Martoma emphasizes the role that the personal benefit test plays in
providing objective facts to determine whether the selective disclosure
was wrongful.111 The dissenting opinion observes that “[w]ithout the
personal benefit rule, many insider-trading cases would require the
government to show few objective facts,”112 and concludes that the
Newman restatement of the Dirks personal benefit test was an appropriate
way to achieve the underlying objective of keeping the focus on objective
facts.
Confusion in the Dirks opinion about why to require evidence of a
personal benefit thus continues to feed disagreement and uncertainty
about how to determine when a selective disclosure is sufficiently
wrongful to trigger insider trading liability.
II. CHANGES SINCE DIRKS
Two developments in particular have fundamentally altered the
relationship between selective disclosure and the prohibition against
insider trading since Dirks was decided in 1983. First, with the enactment
of Regulation FD by the SEC in 2000, selective disclosure by public
companies moved from being a practice largely shaped by federal
common law to being a practice controlled by administrative
rulemaking.113 Second, the acceptance by the Court of the
misappropriation theory of insider trading in United States v. O’Hagan
appropriately expanded the types of conduct that might trigger insider
trading liability to include not only deceptive practices in impersonal
trading markets, but also conduct that deceives the source from
which material nonpublic information is misappropriated.114 These
developments are discussed in further detail below.
A. Enactment of Regulation FD
With the enactment of Regulation FD in 2000 the SEC put in place
disclosure requirements that regulated the selective disclosure practices
of public companies.115 The essence of Regulation FD is the requirement
111. See supra Subsection I.A.1. for a discussion of the goal of establishing objective criteria
in the Dirks’ personal benefit test.
112. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 76 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
113. SEC Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2014).
114. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997).
115. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100. For an overview of Regulation FD, see Jill Fisch, Regulation FD:
An Alternative Approach to Addressing Information Asymmetry, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
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that:
[w]henever [a public company], or any person acting on its
behalf, discloses any material nonpublic information
regarding that [company] or its securities to any person [who
is a market professional or might buy or sell company
shares], the [company] shall make public disclosure of that
information [that is reasonably designed to provide broad,
non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the
public] . . . .116
Several considerations informed the SEC decision to engage in this
new mode of disclosure regulation. First, the declining cost of
information dissemination made it possible for public companies to
regularly disclose information simultaneously to as wide an audience as
desired.117 Second, the SEC viewed the selective disclosure of material
nonpublic information as inconsistent with ordinary investors’ concept of
what constituted fair play in securities markets.118 As the introductory
paragraph of Regulation FD’s Proposing Release stated, the “proposals
are designed to promote the full and fair disclosure of information by
issuers.”119 The Proposing Release goes on to explain that “we do not
believe that allowing issuers to disclose material information selectively
to analysts is in the best interests of investors or the securities markets
generally. Instead, to the maximum extent practicable, we believe that all
investors should have access to an issuer’s material disclosures at the
same time.”120
In regulating the selective disclosure of material nonpublic
information with Regulation FD, the SEC limited the scope of the
prohibition against selective disclosure in several ways to minimize
unwelcome side effects. First, the rule recognized the possibility of an
inadvertent selective disclosure of material nonpublic information, and

INSIDER TRADING 112, 112–14 (Stephen M. Bainbridge ed., 2013). For recent articles questioning
the optimality of Regulation FD, see Epstein, supra note 11, at 1507; Kevin S. Haeberle & M.
Todd Henderson, Information-Dissemination Law: The Regulation of How Market-Moving
Information Is Revealed, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1385–86 (2016); Joseph A. Grundfest,
Regulation FD in the Age of Facebook and Twitter: Should the SEC Sue Netflix? 7 (Rock Ctr. for
Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 131, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2209525.
116. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a).
117. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,593 (proposed Dec.
28, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100–.103).
118. Id. at 72,592.
119. Id. at 72,590.
120. Id. at 72,591.
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included a provision that explained how to respond if this happened.121
Second, the SEC included a provision that prevented investors from
bringing a private right of action against a public company for that
company’s failure to comply with Regulation FD.122 Third, Regulation
FD only applies its prohibition to senior officials of the firm or others in
the firm who regularly communicate with outside investors, and only
prohibits making selective disclosures to those who are likely to use the
information for securities trading.123 Finally, Regulation FD excludes
from its coverage insiders who selectively disclose material nonpublic
information “in breach of a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer,”
presumably so that issuers do not face liability for violations carried out
by rouge employees.124
Bringing the enactment of Regulation FD in to a discussion about
insider trading jurisprudence can lead to an objection that the SEC
designed Regulation FD to avoid influencing determinations about what
constitutes insider trading.125 This objection usually stems from Rule 102
of Regulation FD, which states that “[n]o failure to make a public
disclosure required solely by [Regulation FD] shall be deemed to be a
violation of Rule 10b-5 . . . under the Securities Exchange Act.”126
Pritchard, for example, writes in reference to this Rule 102 of Regulation
FD that: “Notably, Regulation FD was adopted by the SEC pursuant to
its authority to regulate disclosures by public companies. The rule
specifically disclaims defining selective disclosure as fraudulent. This is
by necessity; under Dirks’ personal benefit standard, simple breaches of
confidentiality are not deceptive.”127
But a careful review of the details of Section 102 of Regulation FD
shows that it is a mistake to conclude that Regulation FD was designed
to be kept separate from insider trading jurisprudence. It is more likely
that Section 102 was included to insulate public companies from
121. 17 C.F.R. 243.100(a)(2) (“Promptly, in the case of a non-intentional disclosure.”); SEC
Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(d) (2014) (defining the word “promptly” in the context of
this rule).
122. SEC Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2014). For further discussion of this
provision, see infra notes 125–21 and accompanying text.
123. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100(b)(1), 243.101(c).
124. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(c).
125. Some courts may implicitly accept this argument. See generally United States v.
Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) (an insider trading case decided after Regulation FD was
adopted that never mentions Regulation FD).
126. 17 C.F.R. § 243.102.
127. Pritchard on Dirks, supra note 5, at 870 (footnote omitted); see also Epstein, supra note
11, at 1511 (“Regulation FD flies in the face of Dirks, which stated the exact opposite conclusion
with respect to communications between analysts and insiders.”); Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra note
5, at 40 n.304 (discussing Larry E. Ribstein and other authors’ concerns about Regulation FD as
an unwarranted intrusion into insider trading regulation).
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shareholders who might want to bring private rights of action based on
Regulation FD violations.
Some statements in the Proposing Release of Regulation FD do
suggest that the SEC intended the effects of Regulation FD to be excluded
when considering issues related to insider trading liability. For example,
the Proposing Release states that:
The approach we propose does not treat selective
disclosure as a type of fraudulent conduct or revisit the
insider trading issues addressed in Dirks. Rather, we propose
to use our authority to require full and fair disclosure from
issuers, primarily under Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act,
as a basis for proposed Regulation FD.128
However, there are direct statements in both the Proposing Release
and the Final Rule Release explaining that Rule 102 was included in
Regulation FD solely to prevent public company shareholders from
bringing a private right of action based on purported violations of
Regulation FD. For example, the Final Rule Release explains that “to
remove any doubt that private liability will not result from a Regulation
FD violation, we have revised Regulation FD to make absolutely clear
that it does not establish a duty for purposes of Rule 10b-5 under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘Exchange Act’).”129
Similarly, the discussion issued along with the Final Rule Release
observes that:
[W]e are mindful of the concerns about chilling issuer
disclosure; we agree that the market is best served by more,
not less, disclosure of information by issuers. Because any
potential ‘chill’ is most likely to arise—if at all—from the
128. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,594 (Dec. 28, 1999)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, 249). In a similar vein: “In addition, Regulation FD does
not affect or undermine any existing bases of liability under Rule 10b-5. Thus, for example,
liability for ‘tipping’ under Rule 10b-5 may still exist if a selective disclosure is made in
circumstances that meet the Dirks ‘personal benefit’ test.” Id. at 72,598.
129. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,718 (Aug. 24, 2000)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249).
Regulation FD is an issuer disclosure rule that is designed to create duties
only under Sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act and Section 30 of the
Investment Company Act. It is not an antifraud rule, and unlike other Section
13(a) and 15(d) reporting requirements, it is not intended to create duties under
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act or any other provision of the federal securities
laws. As a result, no private liability will arise from an issuer’s failure to file or
make public disclosure.
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,598 (emphasis added).
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fear of legal liability, we included in proposed Regulation
FD significant safeguards against inappropriate liability.130
The exclusive goal of eliminating a private right of action for
violations of Regulation FD is also consistent with the actual text of Rule
102. Rule 102 only mentions Rule 10b-5, not Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act.131 Rule 10b-5 is the rule under which federal courts have
established the private right of action under federal securities statutes,
whereas Section 10(b) (which is not excluded by Rule 102) provides the
basis for the prosecution of a deceptive or manipulative practice in
violation of federal securities rules or regulations generally.132
The enactment of Regulation FD has had a wide-ranging impact on
public company practices and policies with respect to the selective
disclosure of material nonpublic information. Professor Jill Fisch, in a
recent discussion of the research on the effects of Regulation FD, reports
that: “There is substantial evidence that Regulation FD reduced selective
disclosure and information asymmetries.”133 Regulation FD has also
affected employee policies at public companies. Virtually all public
companies now have employee policies that prohibit any unauthorized
selective disclosure of material nonpublic information.134 The adoption
of a prohibition against any kind of employee selective disclosure also
appears to have spread to firms that advise or work with public firms.135
B. United States v. O’Hagan
The 1997 Supreme Court decision in United States v. O’Hagan136 is
the second development since Dirks that has fundamentally altered the
130. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,718.
131. SEC Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2014) (“No failure to make a public
disclosure required solely by § 243.100 shall be deemed to be a violation of Rule 10b-5 . . . under
the Securities Exchange Act.”).
132. For a discussion of Section 10(b) and its relationship to Rule 10b-5, see generally Steve
Thel, Taking Section 10(b) Seriously: Criminal Enforcement of SEC Rules, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 1 (“Rule 10b-5 does not implement section 10(b); section 10(b) implements Rule 10b-5.”).
133. Fisch, supra note 115, at 125 (footnote omitted).
134. At least for Delaware corporations and other jurisdictions that follow the In re
Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation precedent, failure to put in place a system to
ensure compliance with Regulation FD would constitute a breach of director fiduciary duty. In re
Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996). In the Proposing
Release, the SEC stated: “[W]e expect that most issuers will consider implementing appropriate
disclosure policies to guard against selective disclosure.” Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,598 n.57; see also Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra note 5, at 40
(“Moreover, virtually all publicly traded companies now have stringent policies and procedures
in place to guard against Regulation FD violations.”).
135. See Epstein, supra note 11, at 1497.
136. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
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landscape for determining when a selective disclosure is wrongful.
O’Hagan involved a lawyer, James Herman O’Hagan, who used material
nonpublic information about an upcoming tender offer to trade for a profit
in Pillsbury Company securities.137 O’Hagan did not gain access to
information about the upcoming tender offer because he was an insider
of Pillsbury.138 Rather, O’Hagan received the information about the
tender offer from the law firm he worked at, Dorsey & Whitney, which
represented Grand Metropolitan PLC (“Grand Met”), the company that
initiated the tender offer for Pillsbury.139
The Supreme Court in O’Hagan held that “criminal liability under
§ 10(b) may be predicated on the misappropriation theory.”140 “The
‘misappropriation theory’ holds that a person commits fraud ‘in
connection with’ a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for
securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the
information.”141
The misappropriation theory represents an important extension of the
prohibition against insider trading. Prior to the decision in O’Hagan, the
only locus for deception that the Supreme Court had affirmed could lead
to an insider trading violation were transactions involving the actual
purchase or sale of securities.142 Because these transactions typically
occur on impersonal securities markets, there is unlikely to be
communication between the person possessing the material nonpublic
information and the person who is on the other side of the transaction. As
a result, prior to O’Hagan, the only type of deceptive conduct that could
trigger insider trading liability on a public securities exchange was
silence.
With O’Hagan, the Court recognized a second locus for deception that
could lead to insider trading liability, namely dealings between the
misappropriator and the source of the information.143 The types of
deceptive conduct that a misappropriator might engage in when taking
information from the source are far more numerous than the silence that
constitutes the only type of deception that can take place on an impersonal
securities market.144 As but one simple example, the misappropriator
137. Id. at 647.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 650.
141. Id. at 652.
142. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 650–51 (1983).
143. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653.
144. Professor Gregory Klass recently observed the importance of distinguishing different
ways in which deception might be carried out. Gregory Klass, Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in
the Law of Deception, 100 GEO. L.J. 449 (2012). Of particular interest is the contrast Klass draws
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might make an affirmative misrepresentation in order to gain access to a
company’s material nonpublic information.
Three additional aspects of the O’Hagan decision are noteworthy
when evaluating how the holding in this case compels an updating of our
understanding of the relationship between selective disclosure and insider
trading. First, the Court in O’Hagan is unwavering in its conclusion that
the “in connection with” language in the statute does not require that the
deceptive conduct occur only when and where securities are traded.145
The opinion observes, for example, that “[t]he statute thus proscribes (1)
using any deceptive device (2) in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities, in contravention of rules prescribed by the Commission. The
provision, as written, does not confine its coverage to deception of a
purchaser or seller of securities.”146
Second, the O’Hagan opinion does not directly address how the
misappropriation theory might alter the determination of when a selective
disclosure should trigger insider trading liability. There is no discussion
in O’Hagan, for example, of how to evaluate a chain of events where
there is first a misappropriation of material nonpublic information, and
then a selective disclosure of that misappropriated information, and
finally a trade based upon that selective disclosure. After O’Hagan, an
open question therefore remains as to whether or how the “in connection
with” language would apply to a scenario combining misappropriation
and tipping. Lower courts are split on how to evaluate this chain of
events.147 The Supreme Court in Salman explicitly declined to address

between deception by action and deception by silence. According to Klass the test for a deceptive
act carried out by action is relatively simple, whereas the test that needs to be applied when a
deception is carried out by inaction is necessarily a more nuanced test. Klass observes that “there
is a deep error in the common law tendency to conflate fraud by misrepresentation, fraud by
concealment, and fraud by nondisclosure, which in fact involve different regulatory approaches
and therefore require attention to different aspects of a transaction.” Id. at 450.
145. Id. at 656.
146. Id. at 651.
147. The majority view expressed, for example, in United States v. Newman, appears to be
that the personal benefit test is an added element to find wrongdoing if the person who
misappropriated the information did not trade on the information directly but instead chose to
selectively disclose the misappropriated information. Compare United States v. Newman, 773
F.3d 438, 446 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The elements of tipping liability are the same, regardless of
whether the tipper’s duty arises under the ‘classical’ or the ‘misappropriation’ theory.” (citing
SEC v. Obus, 693 F. 3d 276, 285–86 (2d Cir. 2012))), and SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1274–80
(11th Cir. 2003) (applying the personal benefit test to misappropriating tipper), with SEC v.
Musella, 748 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“The misappropriation theory of liability
does not require a showing of a benefit to the tipper . . . .”), and United States v. Whitman, 904 F.
Supp. 2d 363, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Thus, the tippee’s knowledge that disclosure of the insider
information was unauthorized is sufficient for liability in a misappropriation case.”).
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this issue.148
Third, the O’Hagan opinion does not consider whether the only type
of deceptive conduct that could trigger misappropriation insider trading
liability is the breach of a fiduciary duty.149 This ambiguity in O’Hagan

There are reasonable arguments on both sides of this divide. For example, some argue that to
exclude the personal benefit test requirement in misappropriation insider trading cases would
allow prosecutors to avoid the personal benefit test altogether by always charging classical insider
trading cases as misappropriation cases instead. See, e.g., 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 5, § 6:13
(“To allow a prosecutor or plaintiff to avoid the impact of the personal benefit approach simply
by pleading the misappropriation theory would in effect operate to overrule the Dirks decision, a
questionable step absent legislative reform.”).
Others argue that selective disclosures involving the misappropriation theory should be
evaluated differently, because the elements necessary to determine if a misappropriation has
occurred are different from those required to determine if classical insider trading has occurred.
See, e.g., United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1993); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d
197, 202 (2d Cir. 1984). As the Department of Justice observed:
The distinct duties underlying the classical and misappropriation theories
give rise to different types of breaches of those duties . . . .
. . . A misappropriation case requires no showing of a personal benefit to the
tipper, because the breach is inherent in the tipper’s theft of confidential
information. The theft alone, in violation of the source of information’s property
right to the information, is a breach of the person’s duty to the source of the
information.
Plaintiff SEC’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 4, SEC v. Payton, 97 F. Supp. 3d
558 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 14-CV-04644-JSR), 2015 WL 3799400; see also Merritt B. Fox &
George Tepe, Insider Trading: Personal Benefit Has No Place in Misappropriation Tipping
Cases, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (July 25, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/ 2017/07/25/
insider-trading-personal-benefit-has-no-place-in-misappropriation-tipping-cases/.
A straightforward reading of Dirks will not resolve this dispute. The sentence that best
summarizes its test for tipper/tippee liability reads:
[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to
trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his
fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and
the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983). This statement assumes that there is only one reason
selective disclosure by an insider can lead to an insider trading violation: a breach of a “fiduciary
duty to the shareholder.” Id. Therefore, Dirks is silent as to whether to apply the personal benefit
test when the relevant breach of fiduciary duty is owed to a party other than the firm’s
shareholders.
148. 137 S. Ct. 420, 425 n.2 (2016).
149. O’Hagan refers to the crucial test as involving whether there was deception as often as
it refers to the crucial test as involving whether there was a breach of a fiduciary duty. Compare
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656 (“A misappropriator who trades on the basis of material, nonpublic
information, in short, gains his advantageous market position through deception . . . .”), with id.
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is not surprising: the Court was addressing a situation where the
misappropriator’s deceptive conduct involved a breach of a fiduciary
duty, so a discussion about other types of deceptive conduct was not
germane to the decision.150
The question left open by O’Hagan, whether only a breach of a
fiduciary duty or some other types of deceptive conduct as well might
constitute misappropriation, is the converse of the issue the Court
addressed in Santa Fe Industries, Inc., v. Green.151 In Santa Fe the Court
held that as long as an investor’s “choice was fairly presented, and
[investors] were furnished with all relevant information on which to base
their decision,” then a fiduciary duty breach would not involve the type
of deceptive conduct necessary to trigger Section 10(b) liability.152 The
question here is not whether there can be a fiduciary duty breach without
deception (the issue in Santa Fe), but whether there can be deception
without a fiduciary duty breach.
The possibility of a situation where there is misappropriation and
deception but no fiduciary breach is not just a theoretical curiosity. SEC
v. Dorozhko153 raised precisely this issue. In that case, a computer hacker,
Oleksandr Dorozhko, allegedly hacked into the computers of Thomson
Financial, Inc. to access material nonpublic information about a
forthcoming earnings announcement from IMS Health, Inc., a public
company.154 Dorozhko, a resident of Ukraine, had no fiduciary
relationship with either Thomson Financial or IMS Health.155 Dorozhko,
therefore, could not have breached a fiduciary duty either to the source
from which he misappropriated the information or to the company the
information was about.156 Yet he still might have gained access to
information about the forthcoming IMS Health earnings report through
deceptive conduct, depending on the details of how he hacked into the
Thomson Financial computers.157
In Dorozhko, the Second Circuit held that Dorozhko’s deceptive
conduct could trigger insider trading liability under the misappropriation
at 652 (“[T]he misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception
of those who entrusted him with access to confidential information.”).
150. Id. at 647. For that matter, nor would a discussion of tipper liability be relevant to the
particular facts of O’Hagan, where there was no tipping involved.
151. 430 U.S. 462, 473–75 (1977).
152. Id. at 474.
153. 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
154. Id. at 44.
155. Id. at 44–45.
156. Id. at 45.
157. Id. at 44 (providing that “an anonymous computer hacker attempted to gain access to
the IMS earnings report by hacking into a secure server at Thomson prior to the report’s official
release”).
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theory, even though he did not have a fiduciary relationship with the
source of the information.158 The Dorozhko court concluded:
Chiarella, O’Hagan, and Zandford all stand for the
proposition that nondisclosure in breach of a fiduciary duty
“satisfies § 10(b)’s requirement . . . [of] a ‘deceptive device
or contrivance.’’’ However, what is sufficient is not always
what is necessary . . . .
In this case . . . the SEC argues that defendant
affirmatively misrepresented himself in order to gain access
to material, nonpublic information, which he then used to
trade. We are aware of no precedent of the Supreme Court
or our Court that forecloses or prohibits the SEC’s
straightforward theory of fraud. Absent a controlling
precedent that ‘‘deceptive’’ has a more limited meaning than
its ordinary meaning, we see no reason to complicate the
enforcement of Section 10(b) by divining new
requirements.159
Langevoort, for one, agrees with the Dorozhko panel’s conclusion that
deceptive conduct need not involve a breach of a fiduciary duty, writing
that:
If one accepts the court’s characterization of hacking, we
have real deception here, and do not need to resort to
constructive fraud. Rather this poses the opposite question:
is there any reason to consider the two fiduciary-based
theories exclusive statements of insider trading’s scope? The
Second Circuit could think of no good reason to, and neither
can I.160
The Dorozhko holding suggests that O’Hagan may not limit
misappropriation insider trading violations to deceptive conduct arising
from a fiduciary duty breach, but Dorozhko does not address how this
conclusion affects our understanding of the relationship between
selective disclosure and insider trading. The important question left
unanswered by Dorozhko and O’Hagan is how to evaluate a selective
disclosure when the original misappropriation involves deceptive
conduct other than the breach of a fiduciary duty. Suppose, for example,
that rather than trade himself Dorozhko had sold the information he
misappropriated from Thomson Financial to a third party for that third
party to use for securities trading. What role, if any, a personal benefit
158. Id. at 51.
159. Id. at 49 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
160. Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the Contemporary Law of Insider
Trading, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 459.
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test would play in this context is unclear.
In 1997, the acceptance of the misappropriation theory of insider
trading in O’Hagan expanded the types of deceptive conduct that could
trigger insider trading liability to include deceiving the source of that
information. In 2000, the enactment of Regulation FD moved the
regulation of selective disclosure from federal courts to the SEC and
prohibited public firms from selectively disclosing material nonpublic
information to Wall Street analysts.161 For the reasons detailed below,
both of these developments have fundamentally altered the calculus of
how to determine when a selective disclosure should trigger insider
trading liability.
III. THE DEMISE OF THE PERSONAL BENEFIT TEST
After the enactment of Regulation FD and the O’Hagan decision, it is
logical to ask to what extent the various justifications the Court relied on
for adopting the personal benefit test in Dirks continue to support
requiring evidence of a personal benefit to find that a selective disclosure
is sufficiently wrongful to trigger insider trading liability.
A. Justifications for the Personal Benefit Test Reconsidered
The four justifications that appear in Dirks for adopting the personal
benefit test are: (1) establishing objective criteria, (2) insulating
legitimate corporate communications from liability, (3) preventing
circumvention of the insider trading prohibition, and (4) identifying when
a sufficiently serious fiduciary duty breach has occurred.162
In light of the enactment of Regulation FD and the O’Hagan decision,
these justifications no longer provide support for making evidence of a
personal benefit a necessary requirement for proving tipper wrongdoing.
First, if the goal of the personal benefit test is to provide objective criteria,
then the more reliable approach in today’s securities markets would be to
adopt a rebuttable presumption that repeated selective access to material
nonpublic information indicates that deceptive conduct is occurring.163
Second, federal courts no longer need to create a common law rule to
protect legitimate public company selective disclosure practices, because
with the advent of Regulation FD such disclosures are now prohibited.164

161. See supra Section II.A.
162. See supra Section I.A.
163. See infra Subsection III.A.1.
164. See infra Subsection III.A.2. For a similar observation, see Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra
note 5, at 42 (“Regulation FD leaves corporate insiders, particularly those in investor relations or
finance departments, with little room for a credible claim that selective disclosures about earnings
information were prompted by a mistaken belief about whether it ‘already has been disclosed or
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Third, if the goal of the personal benefit test is to prevent people from
using selective disclosures to circumvent the prohibition against insider
trading, then the common law rule prohibiting any sharing of chattel or
land that belongs to another is the more appropriate model to follow.165
Finally, evidence of deceptive conduct no longer needs to hinge
exclusively on whether someone receives a personal benefit.166 For these
reasons, as detailed below, after the enactment of Regulation FD and the
O’Hagan decision, it no longer makes sense to try to shoehorn the various
rationales offered in Dirks for prohibiting some types of selective
disclosures into a personal benefit test.
1. Objective Criteria
One justification offered in Dirks for requiring evidence of a personal
benefit is that such a test allows judges and prosecutors to focus on
objective criteria.167 This objective criteria justification remains the most
plausible reason for continuing to require evidence of a personal benefit,
despite the changes highlighted above since the 1983 Dirks decision.
There are, however, countervailing considerations that suggest,
particularly after the enactment of Regulation FD and the O’Hagan
decision, that there are now better ways to establish objective criteria of
tipper wrongdoing for judges and prosecutors.168 Courts could adopt a
rebuttable presumption that the repeated selective disclosure of material
nonpublic information about a public company is evidence that the
information is being disclosed deceptively.169
Such a presumption would have made little sense in 1983 when Dirks
was decided, because the repeated selective disclosure of public company
material nonpublic information appears to have been a common

that it is not material enough to affect the market.’” (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662
(1983))).
165. See infra Subsection III.A.3.
166. See infra Subsection III.A.4.
167. See supra Subsection I.A.1.
168. Also, it is helpful to note that establishing objective criteria for determining tipper
wrongdoing was never the exclusive justification for requiring evidence of a personal benefit. If
establishing objective criteria is the only goal, then a rule establishing no liability or strict liability
is a simpler solution. The goal of establishing objective criteria is necessarily a second-order
consideration when attempting to implement the statutory purpose of prohibiting deceptive
conduct.
169. Since only repeated practice may trigger this presumption, it is unlikely to come into
play when selective disclosure is not intentional. For the basis of this observation, see Nagy,
Beyond Dirks, supra note 5, at 46.
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practice.170 But it is hard to imagine today circumstances where the
repeated selective disclosure of material nonpublic information would be
acceptable. In almost all situations, systematic selective disclosure would
violate both Regulation FD and company policy. 171 In this new
environment, the rebuttable presumption establishes an objective
standard that reflects the extent to which the dividing line between what
constitutes an acceptable and unacceptable selective disclosure has
shifted since Dirks was decided in 1983.
Another reason to doubt that a personal benefit test will deliver the
objective certainty sought by the Dirks Court is the judicial experience in
trying to apply the personal benefit test over the last thirty-plus years.172
This is in part due to the inherently ambiguous nature of determining what
does or does not constitute a personal benefit. Applying the personal
benefit test, at least as delineated in Dirks, raises difficult issues in
application that may have been unforeseen in 1983.173
Both changed practices and thirty-five years of experience suggest
that requiring evidence of a personal benefit is no longer a particularly
useful tool for providing judges and prosecutors objective evidence of
tipper wrongdoing.
170. In Dirks, for example, the Court noted that it was not only common practice for public
companies to selectively disclose information to certain investors, especially Wall Street analysts,
but also the SEC welcomed and even encouraged this practice:
All disclosures of confidential corporate information are not inconsistent with
the duty insiders owe to shareholders. In contrast to the extraordinary facts of
this case, the more typical situation . . . is when insiders disclose information to
analysts. In some situations, the insider will act consistently with his fiduciary
duty to shareholders, and yet release of the information may affect the market.
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 661–62 (1983) (citation omitted).
The Dirks opinion goes on to suggest in an example that selective disclosures would, in fact,
only be acceptable if they were inadvertent, stating that, “[f]or example, it may not be clear—
either to the corporate insider or to the recipient analyst—whether the information will be viewed
as material nonpublic information.” Id. at 662. This example, however, is essentially a nonsequitur. For an article justifying on economic terms the selective disclosure of material nonpublic
information to Wall Street analysts, see generally Stephen J. Choi, Selective Disclosure in the
Public Capital Markets, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 533, 540 (2002).
171. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
172. For a review of the difficulty courts have had in applying the personal benefit test, see
Brief of the NYU Center on the Administration of Criminal Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, supra note 40, at 6–13.
173. But see Dirks, 463 U.S. at 676 n.13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The distinction between
pure altruism and self-interest has puzzled philosophers for centuries; there is no reason to believe
that courts and administrative law judges will have an easier time with it.”). It also may be true
that unequivocal acceptance of a formulation of the personal benefit test in a manner designed
more directly to establish objective criteria, such as one requiring evidence of a pecuniary gain,
could minimize some of these difficulties.
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2. Policy Concerns
The second Dirks justification for requiring evidence of a personal
benefit is that such a requirement represented the Court’s best effort in
1983 to balance policy considerations.174 The relevant policy
considerations the Court identified in Dirks were, on the one hand,
allowing the government to prosecute deceptive practices versus, on the
other hand, allowing firms to selectively disseminate material nonpublic
information to investors without fear of criminal prosecution.175 But these
policy concerns no longer justify requiring evidence of a personal benefit
to determine when a selective disclosure constitutes a deceptive practice.
In 1983, when Dirks was decided, public firms may have had a
legitimate interest in facilitating ongoing selective disclosures to certain
market participants.176 But public companies no longer have a legitimate
interest in making these types of selective disclosures because of the
enactment of Regulation FD.177 More generally, after the enactment of
Regulation FD, there is less of a need for federal judges to establish
common law rules that balance policy interests in the context of the
selective disclosure practices of public companies. This is now a practice
governed by administrative rule-making.
The personal benefit test may have assisted courts in distinguishing
between legitimate and illegitimate selective disclosures, but there is no
longer a need for a common law rule protecting this demarcation.
3. Prevent Circumvention
The third justification offered in Dirks for requiring evidence of a
personal benefit is that this test prevents people from circumventing the
prohibition against insider trading by “selling” or “spending” their
proprietary access to material nonpublic information to avoid illegally
trading on inside information.178
174. See supra Subsection I.A.2.
175. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658–59 (recognizing a need for a ban on tippee trading while also
noting the “inhibiting influence” such a ban could have on the role of market analysts).
There is an additional policy consideration relevant to a determination of whether a personal
benefit test remains a useful common law construct. The Supreme Court in O’Hagan expanded
the types of policy concerns it considered relevant to the analysis of when to impose insider
trading liability. As Nagy points out, in the O’Hagan decision, “Justice Ginsburg framed
the . . . misappropriation theory to advance the important policy objectives of ensuring ‘honest
securities markets’ and promoting ‘investor confidence.’” Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra note 5, at
18 (quoting United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997)). This additional policy
consideration, Nagy argues, suggests that a broader prohibition against selective disclosure makes
sense. Id. at 40–41.
176. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658–59.
177. See supra Section II.A.
178. See supra Subsection I.A.3.
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This anti-circumvention goal does not justify limiting liability for
selective disclosure to situations in which there is either an exchange for
“a pecuniary gain” or “a gift of confidential information to a trading
relative or friend.”179 If the goal is to prevent circumventing the
prohibition against insider trading, then the appropriate rule should
simply prohibit unauthorized selective disclosure of the information.180
The common law long ago recognized that an outright prohibition on
gifting property that belongs to another without permission is the most
efficient way to prevent agents from benefiting indirectly where direct
benefits are prohibited. If preventing circumvention is the goal of a ban
on selective disclosure, then there is no good reason to reject the common
law prohibition on gifting someone else’s property.
4. Element of a Fraud or a Fiduciary Breach
A fourth justification offered for the Court’s adoption of the personal
benefit test in Dirks was that only a personal benefit test could properly
identify situations where an insider had either acted fraudulently or
breached a fiduciary duty when making a selective disclosure. 181 But, as
discussed above, common law precedent does not compel this
conclusion. The common law does not treat evidence of a personal benefit
as a necessary element to conclude that conduct is deceptive or that a
fiduciary duty breach has occurred.182
This disconnect is even more pronounced in 2017 than it was in 1983.
As Professor Donna Nagy has eloquently shown, since the Dirks
decision, Delaware state courts have expanded the types of conduct that
would constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty beyond just transactions
that involve self-enrichment.183 These developments in state fiduciary
law mean that the connections between receipt of a personal benefit and
the breach of a fiduciary duty, one of the justifications in Dirks for
introducing a personal benefit test, are even more tenuous than when
Dirks was decided.
In 1983 the Supreme Court was creating new federal common law in
an effort to make subtle and challenging distinctions between legal and
illegal selective disclosures by individuals working at public companies.
Such distinctions are much easier to make in 2017. Not only does
Regulation FD disallow virtually all selective disclosures made to
someone who intends to trade based on the disclosed information, but
also public companies now have policies that prohibit employees from
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658–59; see supra text accompanying notes 61–62.
See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
See supra Subsection I.A.4.
See supra text accompanying notes 76–83.
Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra note 5, at 43–45.
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making these kinds of disclosures.184
In 2017, one can be fairly certain that the intentional selective
disclosure of material nonpublic information violates either Regulation
FD, firm policy, or both. The rationales for requiring evidence of a
personal benefit test to find that a selective disclosure is wrongful, offered
in 1983, point in a new direction in 2017. Evidence of a personal benefit
is no longer necessary to safely conclude that tipper wrongdoing has
occurred.
B. Is the Personal Benefit Test Binding Precedent?
Even if the logic that justified requiring introduction of a personal
benefit test in Dirks no longer justifies the same conclusion today, there
is an alternative justification for continuing to require proof of a personal
benefit. That justification comes not from the Court’s reasoning about
why a personal benefit test made sense, but simply from the fact that this
was the holding in Dirks. The rule of stare decisis could provide a good
enough reason for continuing to require proof of a personal benefit,
notwithstanding major changes since the Dirks case was decided in
1983.185
This Section addresses the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate
to reconsider a precedent simply because circumstances have changed.
For two reasons, stare decisis does not apply to the Dirks personal benefit
test. First, the Dirks personal benefit test, as a species of federal common
law, is the type of precedent a court needs to reevaluate in the light of
changed circumstances.186 Second, as with much of the insider trading
doctrine, the discussion of a personal benefit test in Dirks is dicta and not
an actual holding in the case.187 This Section discusses each of these
reasons stare decisis should not apply to the Dirks personal benefit test.
1. Stare Decisis and Federal Common Law
Weighing the impact of changes in market practices and regulations
since Dirks might seem inappropriate, because of the general principle of
stare decisis. Stare decisis is the principle that “today’s Court should
184. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,598 (Dec. 28,
1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, 249); supra text accompanying notes 127–28.
185. Brief for the United States at 29, Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016) (No.15628) (“Principles of stare decisis apply with special force here because Dirks—and its holding
that a tipper personally benefits by giving a gift—has been the law for more than 30 years.”). This
appears to be adding a required element that is not clearly enunciated in either the Dirks or
O’Hagan opinions, but which can logically be inferred from the combination of these two earlier
opinions.
186. See infra Subsection III.B.1.
187. See infra Subsection III.B.2.
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stand by yesterday’s decisions.”188 But in certain situations, even a court
committed to stare decisis should take into account changed
circumstances. The Dirks personal benefit test, which combines statutory
interpretation and federal common law, would appear to be such a
situation.
On first impression, the Dirks decision, because it involves an
interpretation of a federal securities statute, might seem entitled to a
higher level of deference than other types of precedent. The Supreme
Court has held that in cases involving statutory interpretation the Court is
more forcefully bound by past precedent than in cases involving common
law or constitutional matters.189 The theory behind granting a higher level
of deference to cases involving statutory interpretation is that Congress
can step in and override a court’s interpretation, if Congress is dissatisfied
with the court’s reading of the statute.190 For example, in the Supreme
Court decision Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, the Court relied on
this theory and refused to overturn a precedent that interpreted a patent
statute, despite strong arguments that the statute was wrongly
interpreted.191
However, not all cases involving statutory interpretation are shown
equal deference by the Court. The Supreme Court also recognizes that in
certain areas of statutory interpretation Congress has turned to the federal
courts to fill in the interstices of the law necessary to achieve a general
purpose established by the statute. In these situations, the Court is acting
more as a court of common law, and the Court treats a precedent
involving a statutory interpretation in this context as they would a
common law precedent, which means that holdings need to be updated as
circumstances change.192
This exception to the general rule of heightened deference to cases
involving statutory interpretation comes into play in the area of antitrust
law, for example. Justice Elena Kagan recognized this exception in her
majority opinion in Kimble, writing: “This Court has viewed stare decisis
as having less-than-usual force in cases involving the Sherman
Act . . . . We have therefore felt relatively free to revise our legal analysis
as economic understanding evolves and . . . to reverse antitrust
188. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015).
189. Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Court of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 317, 319 (2005) (“The Supreme Court has accorded heightened deference to its statutory
precedent for roughly a century.”). But see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling
Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L. REV. 1361, 1363–64 (1988) (proposing a weakened standard to
overrule statutory precedents).
190. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409.
191. Id. (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932)).
192. See Eskridge, supra note 182, at 1364.
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precedents that misperceived a practice’s competitive consequences.”193
Insider trading jurisprudence would appear to be similar to antitrust
jurisprudence in this respect. Time and again Congress has shown its
desire to delegate to the federal courts the task of delineating precisely
what kind of behavior constitutes illegal insider trading. For example,
when legislation in 1984 and in 1988 increased penalties for insider
trading violations, Congress decided not to include provisions that would
specify which particular types of conduct constitute illegal insider
trading, preferring to continue to defer to the courts to make this
determination.194 Similarly, when the Stock Trading on Congressional
Knowledge (STOCK) Act of 2012 restricted insider trading by members
of Congress, the final bill included “explicit legislative recognition that
the Exchange Act encompasses insider trading prohibitions that arise
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”195 Here again Congress chose to
defer to the judiciary’s determination of what constitutes insider trading.
If the analogy between antitrust law and insider trading jurisprudence
is correct, then requiring evidence of personal benefit to prove that a
selective disclosure is deceptive is a precedent that could be reevaluated
in light of changed circumstances. And, as described above,
circumstances with respect to what constitutes a legitimate selective
disclosure and what kinds of deceptive practices might trigger insider
trading liability have changed dramatically since 1983.196
2. Personal Benefit Test Is Dicta
Additionally, courts might not be bound by the personal benefit test
enunciated in Dirks because the discussion of a personal benefit test in
Dirks is almost certainly dicta. To understand why the Dirks personal
benefit test is dicta, it is necessary to step back and review all the issues
regarding selective disclosure liability addressed by the Court in Dirks.
The Dirks opinion addresses three different questions that arise when
considering whether a selective disclosure might lead to an insider trading
violation. These are: (1) What makes the tipper’s actions sufficiently
wrongful to trigger insider trading liability? (2) Can the tippee face
insider trading liability absent improper conduct by the tipper? and (3)
How much tippee involvement in wrongdoing is necessary for her to face
liability?197
193. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2412–13 (citation omitted). But see Barak Orbach, Antitrust Stare
Decisis, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Oct. 2015) (arguing that the ways in which stare decisis is applied
to antitrust law are more complex than suggested by the Kimble opinion).
194. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
195. Nagy, Beyond Dirks, supra note 5, at 34.
196. See supra Part II.
197. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665, 667 (1983).
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An analysis of the answers the Court provides in Dirks to the second
and third of these questions is presented below. This analysis shows that
the answers to these two questions, given the facts in Dirks, provide more
than sufficient grounds for the Court to conclude that there should not be
insider trading liability imposed in the Dirks case. The Court did not need
to resolve when a selective disclosure is a manipulative or deceptive
practice to reverse the decision against Dirks. The entire discussion of a
personal benefit test in Dirks is dicta.198
In deciding Dirks, the Supreme Court for the first time addressed how
to determine insider trading liability when information is covertly passed
from one person to another. In doing so, the Court needed to resolve a
number of issues related to this type of wrongdoing. One question to be
addressed was whether a tippee can face insider trading liability absent
improper conduct by the tipper (the second question listed above). Dirks
held that if there is no tipper wrongdoing then there will be no tippee
liability.199
This holding, that tippee liability is exclusively derivative of tipper
liability, appears at various points throughout the Dirks opinion. For
example, Justice Powell writes in the majority opinion that “some tippees
must assume an insider’s duty to the shareholders not because they
receive inside information, but rather because it has been made available
to them improperly.”200 This is why the Court describes liability for
trading based on nonpublic information as “derivative” of wrongdoing by
the person providing the information.201 The statement in Dirks that “the
tippee’s duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider’s
duty”202 summarizes the idea that the recipient of selectively disclosed
material nonpublic information will not face insider trading liability
absent improper conduct by the party that provided the information.
The conclusion that tippee liability is derivative of tipper liability
would seem to follow logically from the Court’s holding three years
earlier in Chiarella v. United States.203 In Chiarella, the majority wrote
that “[w]hen an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can
be no fraud absent a duty to speak,” and that no such duty arises “from

198. However, it is noteworthy that the Salman opinion does not treat the Dirks personal
benefit test as dicta. Alito writes: “Salman points out that many insider trading cases—including
several that Dirks cited—involved insiders who personally profited through the misuse of trading
information. But this observation does not undermine the test Dirks articulated and applied.”
Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016) (emphasis added).
199. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667.
200. Id. at 660 (emphasis omitted).
201. Id. at 662.
202. Id. at 659.
203. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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the mere possession of nonpublic market information.”204 In fact, a
footnote in Dirks states that Chiarella compels the conclusion that tippee
liability can only be derivative.205
But how Chiarella helps to address whether someone who trades
using selectively disclosed information should face insider trading
liability absent wrongdoing by the tipper is not as self-evident as the
Dirks opinion implies.206 Rather, other considerations provide more
direct support for the holding that tippee liability is exclusively derivative
204. Id. at 235.
205. The footnote in Dirks explains the relevance of Chiarella as follows:
As we emphasized in Chiarella, mere possession of nonpublic information does
not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain; only a specific relationship does
that. And we do not believe that the mere receipt of information from an insider
creates such a special relationship between the tippee and the corporation’s
shareholders.
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 656 n.15.
206. The only discussion in Chiarella about the situation where someone trades using
selectively disclosed material nonpublic information appears in the following footnote:
“Tippees” of corporate insiders have been held liable under §10(b) because they
have a duty not to profit from the use of inside information that they know is
confidential and know or should know came from a corporate insider. The
tippee’s obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after
the fact in the insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty.
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12 (citation omitted).
The first sentence in this footnote might reasonably be read to endorse the idea that it is the
confidential nature of the information, and not the purpose for which it was disclosed, which
makes trading based upon selective disclosed information a violation of § 10(b). This is opposite
to the conclusion in Dirks that liability from trading on selectively disclosed information can only
be derivative. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667. Moreover, the case Chiarella cited, Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, holds that the confidential nature of the information provided in a selective disclosure can
be sufficient to trigger tippee liability. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
495 F.2d 228, 238 (2d Cir. 1974) (“Since upon the admitted facts before us the selling defendants
knew or should have known of the confidential corporate source of the revised earnings
information and they knew of its non-public nature, they were under a duty not to trade . . . .”).
For an alternative reading of this sentence in the Chiarella footnote, see Coles, supra note 5, at
203–04.
It is intriguing that in initially communicating with his fellow Justices about the Dirks case,
Justice Powell chose to exclude this first sentence of the Chiarella footnote from his review of
the relevant discussion in Chiarella, perhaps because it might be read to endorse a broader test
for tippee liability than he preferred. See Pritchard on Dirks, supra note 5, at 860.
On the other hand, the second sentence in the Chiarella footnote does suggest that liability
based on selective disclosure can only result when the individual who selectively discloses the
information does so in breach of a fiduciary duty. Overall, the discussion in the Chiarella footnote
is equivocal as to whether trading based on selectively disclosed material nonpublic information
can provide an independent basis for insider trading liability.
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of wrongdoing by the tipper. For example, the majority in Dirks cites a
statement directly on point in oral argument by SEC attorney Paul
Gonson. Gonson stated that the liability of Dirks and others who traded
“is derivative of Secrist’s duty in this case.”207 The Dirks opinion also
cites the concurring opinion of an SEC Commissioner in an enforcement
case involving liability for trading based on information that was
selectively disclosed to an outsider.208 In that case, Investors
Management Co., the Commissioner wrote in a concurrence that the
“[t]ippee responsibility must be related back to insider responsibility.”209
The Dirks majority appears to be concerned that allowing a basis for
tippee liability other than wrongdoing by the tipper would require
accepting that insider trading liability can attach whenever someone
comes “into possession of material ‘corporate information that they know
is confidential and know or should know came from a corporate
insider.’”210 The Dirks majority chooses to reject explicitly the purported
view “the SEC maintains that anyone who knowingly receives nonpublic
material information from an insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose
before trading.”211
Another question Dirks addresses about the link between selective
disclosure and insider trading is: How much involvement in wrongdoing
by the recipient of information (the tippee) is necessary for that person to
face liability (the third question listed above)?212 A court might provide
a wide range of answers to this question. At one extreme, a court might
apply a strict liability rule. Under such a rule, no involvement with or
knowledge of the wrongfulness of the selective disclosure would be
necessary to trigger liability, so long as the selective disclosure itself was
wrongful.213 At the other extreme, a court could apply something
comparable to an aiding and abetting standard. Under such a rule, a court
would only impose liability on a person who trades on selectively
disclosed information if that individual was also involved as an
accomplice in the act of wrongful selective disclosure.

207. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (No. 82-276); see Dirks,
463 U.S. at 659 (“[T]he tippee’s duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider’s
duty.”).
208. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 n.19 (citing Inv’rs Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 651 (1971) (Smith,
Comm’r, concurring)).
209. Inv’rs Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. at 651 (Smith, Comm’r, concurring).
210. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 651.
211. Id. at 656.
212. See supra text accompanying note 190.
213. Such a rule is sometimes applied to the possession of stolen goods. See, e.g., Stuart P.
Green, Thieving and Receiving: Overcriminalizing the Possession of Stolen Property, 14 NEW
CRIM. L. REV. 35, 35–36 (2011).
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The Supreme Court in Dirks provides something of a middle-ground
answer to this question of how much “involvement” by the tippee is
required to trigger tippee insider trading liability, stating:
Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders
of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic
information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary
duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has
been a breach.214
The Dirks Court settles here on a negligence-like standard to resolve the
question of what level of involvement will trigger tippee liability.215
The most surprising aspect of this particular aspect of the holding in
Dirks is how little attention it receives, despite the relatively novel nature
of the question. The “knows or should know” standard appears only once
in the Dirks opinion.216 Moreover, the footnotes supporting this
conclusion cite cases that offer a variety of standards for determining the
level of tippee involvement necessary to trigger insider trading liability.
While some of the cases Dirks cites to support this holding do apply a
“knows or should have known” standard to determine the extent of tippee
involvement necessary to trigger tippee insider trading liability, others do
not.217
214. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 (emphasis added). Surprisingly, the Salman opinion misstates
the test as requiring actual knowledge of the tipper wrongdoing. Alito writes: “The tippee acquires
the tipper’s duty to disclose or abstain from trading if the tippee knows the information was
disclosed in breach of the tipper’s duty, and the tippee may commit securities fraud by trading in
disregard of that knowledge.” Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 423 (2016) (emphasis
added). This may reflect an effort to shift away from the “knows or should know” standard in
Dirks, or could simply reflects the fact that in Salman the tipper did have actual knowledge of the
tippee wrongdoing.
215. Langevoort, at points in his treatise, seems to suggest that the personal benefit test in
Dirks is a means to evaluate the tippee’s level of “involvement” in the selective disclosure. In
Section 6:13, Langevoort writes:
The only way to taint a tippee with responsibility for such a [misappropriation]
breach is to find a co-venture with the actual fiduciary, and for better or worse,
the Supreme Court has indicated that such coventures exist only where there is
something like a quid pro quo involved in the tip.
18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 5, § 6:13. This is not how this author understands the role the
personal benefit test plays in the opinion. Rather, the personal benefit test appears solely relevant
to determining the wrongfulness of the tipper’s selective disclosure.
216. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
217. On the one hand, the Dirks Court correctly notes that in In re Investors Management
Co., the “SEC itself has recognized that tippee liability properly is imposed only in circumstances
where the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that” the selective disclosure of information was
wrongful. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 n.19. The “knows or should know” standard also appears in the
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Similarly, the Dirks majority opinion favorably cites Mosser v.
Darrow218 as support for the proposition that those who trade on
selectively disclosed information may have liability, but in doing so the
Dirks majority notes that “the transactions of those who knowingly
participate with the fiduciary in such a breach are ‘as forbidden’ as
transactions ‘on behalf of the trustee himself.’”219 Observe that here again
the Dirks Court relies on a precedent without mentioning that the
precedent does not apply the “knows or should know” standard for
triggering tippee liability.220
In any case, the combination of these two holdings, first, that tippee
liability is derivative, and second, that such liability is only imposed when
the tippee “knows or should know” of the breach, makes clear why the
discussion in Dirks about the personal benefit test is actually just dicta.221

footnote in Chiarella that discusses liability for those who trade based on selectively disclosed
information. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980). For a more detailed
discussion of this footnote, see supra note 199.
On the other hand, Dirks cites two Restatement provisions relating to when liability passes to
someone who receives information in violation of a duty owed to the source of the information
that both require actual knowledge. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 n.20. The Restatement of Agency
provision requires actual knowledge (RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 cmt. c (“A person
who, with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal, receives confidential
information from the agent, may be [deemed] . . . a constructive trustee.”)), as does the
Restatement of Restitution(RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 201(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1937)
(“Where a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary communicates confidential
information to a third person, the third person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon
a constructive trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such
information.”)).
218. 341 U.S. 267 (1951).
219. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659 (emphasis added) (quoting Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 272
(1951)).
220. In fact, Pritchard found that earlier drafts of the Dirks opinion included an actual
knowledge standard, that only the final draft contained the “knows or should know” standard, and
that there is no written record as to why the “knows or should know” standard was included in the
final versions of the opinion. Pritchard on Dirks, supra note 5, at 864.
Pritchard contacted the clerk who assisted in preparing the Dirks opinion to ask why the
“knows or should know” standard was adopted. Id. at 865 & n.43. The clerk’s recollection was
that this standard was incorporated “to make the opinion more consistent with those authorities
as well as the concurring opinion of Commissioner Smith in In re Investors Management Co.”
Pritchard on Dirks, supra note 5, at 865. The “knows or should know” language would also make
the standard consistent with footnote 12 of the Chiarella decision. See supra note 199.
221. The Black’s Law Dictionary definition of judicial dictum is an “opinion by a court on a
question that is directly involved . . . , but that is not essential to the decision and therefore not
binding even if it may later be accorded some weight.” Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014). But see Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV.
953, 1065 (2005) (offering the following alternative definition: “A holding consists of those
propositions along the chosen decisional path or paths of reasoning that (1) are actually decided,
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Based on these two holdings for Dirks to face insider trading liability, it
must be true that there was wrongdoing on the part of the original tipper,
Ronald Secrist, and that Dirks either knew or should have known about
this wrongdoing. However, no claim was ever made that Secrist’s original
disclosure constituted deceptive conduct or wrongdoing. A footnote in
the Dirks opinion observes that “we do not understand the SEC to have
relied on any theory of a breach of duty by Secrist in finding that Dirks
breached his duty to Equity Funding’s shareholders.”222 Therefore, the
case against Dirks can be fully resolved without delving into what type
of behavior would have constituted wrongdoing by Secrist if the facts had
been different than those in the present case.223
Justice Powell recognized early on that the discussion of what
constitutes tipper wrongdoing in Dirks would be dicta when he wrote to
his clerk: “Dirks is easy, but is there a general principle?”224 Similarly,
the first memorandum from Justice Powell on the case to his fellow
Justices observed that the “SEC . . . recognized that ‘Dirks’ informants
were entitled to disclose the [Equity Funding] fraud.’”225 The personal
benefit test discussion involved a counter-factual situation.
If the personal benefit test is dicta, the Court is not bound to follow it
as precedent. Similarly, the doctrine of stare decisis does not provide a
compelling reason to ignore changes in securities markets practices and
regulations, most importantly the enactment of Regulation FD and the
O’Hagan decision, when considering whether or how to update the Dirks
test for determining when a selective disclosure is sufficiently deceptive
to trigger insider trading liability. It is not just appropriate but
increasingly necessary to consider anew how to determine when a
selective disclosure is sufficiently wrongful to trigger insider trading
liability.
(2) are based upon the facts of the case, and (3) lead to the judgment. If not a holding, a proposition
stated in a case counts as dicta”).
222. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 666 n.27. The Court also concludes in reversing Dirks’ conviction
with a restatement of the tippee derivative liability footnote from Chiarella. “In the absence of a
breach of duty to shareholders by the insiders, there was no derivative breach by Dirks. Dirks
therefore could not have been ‘a participant after the fact in [an] insider’s breach of a fiduciary
duty.”’ Id. at 667 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980)).
223. Langevoort reaches the same conclusion about whether the discussion of the personal
benefit test was necessary given the other two holdings in the opinion, and writes that the “Court
could have stopped its analysis here and still reversed the Commission, for it was clear, to the
majority at least, that there had been no breach of fiduciary duty by the former Equity Funding
employees . . . .” 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 5, § 4:3.
224. Pritchard on Dirks, supra note 5, at 862.
225. Bobtail Bench Memorandum at 3, Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 (No. 82-276) (alteration in
original).
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IV. A MULTIPLE TRIGGER TEST FOR TIPPER WRONGDOING
To update the test for when a selective disclosure is sufficiently
wrongful to trigger insider trading liability, the appropriate starting point
is the underlying statutory prohibition against deceptive conduct.226 This
statutory prohibition against any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance no longer justifies making evidence of a personal benefit a
necessary condition for determining whether a selective disclosure
should trigger insider trading liability. A better test would recognize that
a personal benefit provides evidence that is likely sufficient, but by no
means necessary, to determine when a selective disclosure is deceptive.
The better approach, which this Article calls the multiple trigger
approach, would recognize that there are several ways to find that a
selective disclosure is sufficiently deceptive to trigger insider trading
liability.
This Section details this multiple trigger approach, considering in
detail two scenarios in which the multiple trigger approach would
correctly conclude that a selective disclosure is sufficiently wrongful to
trigger insider trading liability, but in which neither a personal benefit test
nor a breach of a fiduciary duty test would reach the correct result.
A. Deception Without Personal Benefit or Fiduciary Breach
The basic problem with exclusive reliance on the personal benefit test
(or on a test requiring evidence of a fiduciary duty breach) to determine
when a selective disclosure triggers insider trading liability is that such a
test is unjustifiably underinclusive. There are many situations in which a
selective disclosure unequivocally constitutes a deceptive practice, but in
which there might be neither a personal benefit nor a fiduciary duty
breach. In such situations, there is no good reason to hold as a matter of
law that the selective disclosure cannot trigger insider trading liability.227
This Section describes two scenarios where there is a selective
disclosure involving deceptive conduct, but where there is neither a
personal benefit nor a fiduciary duty breach. In the first scenario, a
computer hacker deceives employees at a public company to gain access
to material nonpublic information and then selectively discloses that
information to a distant friend as a gesture of friendship. That friend, who
is fully cognizant of the deception used to gather the information, trades
for a profit using the information. The second scenario involves the
226. More specifically, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act refers to “any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance,” and Rule 10(b)(5) promulgated thereunder
refers to “any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.” See supra note 8.
227. In many ways the argument here parallels the analysis in Dorozhko except that the
question here involves whether a selective disclosure rather than the garnering of material
nonpublic information involves deceptive conduct.
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doctrinally more complex situation in which an insider at a public
company selectively discloses material nonpublic information about the
firm in violation of Regulation FD, but the insider’s supervisor sanctions
this disclosure.
1. Computer Hacking
The first scenario involves a computer hacker who passes material
nonpublic information on to a distant friend. This scenario is a modified
version of the situation analyzed by the Second Circuit panel in the
Dorozhko case.228
Suppose that a computer hacker gains access to a company’s material
nonpublic information that she intends to use for securities trading
purposes by misrepresenting herself as an employee who misplaced her
user information. Then she passes this material nonpublic information on
to a distant friend as a gesture of friendship. The friend knows how the
information was generated, and still trades on the information for a profit
in the stock market.
The question in this first scenario is whether the distant friend’s trade
violates Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.
Under the Dirks rule that tippee liability can only be derivative of tipper
wrongdoing229 the crucial issue is whether the computer hacker’s
purloining of material nonpublic information was sufficiently wrongful
to trigger insider trading liability.
The evaluation of tipper wrongdoing in this scenario—if based on the
underlying statutory prohibition—would involve two questions. First,
was there deceptive conduct? Here the answer is obviously yes, as the
hacker gained access to the information through an act of deception.
There is no need in this scenario, other than to follow the Dirks precedent,
to consider whether the tipper’s personal benefit was sufficient to make
the act by which the tipper gained access to the information deceptive.
The deceptive nature of the act is self-evident.230
228. See supra notes 146–53 and accompanying text. The risks that this type of computer
hacking might pose to securities markets are significant, as suggested by charges brought in 2015
against hackers who were accused of gaining access to over 150,000 unreleased news stories
related to both public and private companies. See Matthew Goldstein & Alexandra Stevenson,
Nine Charged in Insider Trading Case Tied to Hackers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/12/business/dealbook/insider-trading-sec-hacking-case.html?
_r=0l. See generally Robert T. Denny, Beyond Mere Theft: Why Computer Hackers Trading on
Wrongfully Acquired Information Should Be Held Accountable Under the Securities Exchange
Act, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 963 (highlighting confusion about whether computer hackers can be liable
under the Securities Exchange Act).
229. See supra notes 193–204 and accompanying text.
230. This conclusion is, among other things, supported by SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42
(2d Cir. 2009).
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The second question in evaluating whether there is tippee liability in
this scenario—if based on the underlying statutory prohibition—would
be whether the tipper’s deception is sufficiently “in connection with” a
securities transaction to violate Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.231 In
O’Hagan, the Court held that if someone “misappropriates confidential
information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to
the source of the information,”232 his action is sufficiently in connection
with such a securities transaction to trigger insider trading liability. That
case did not, however, involve passing along information between tippers
and tippees, which further extenuates the connection between the
deceptive conduct and securities market trading. The anti-circumvention
rationale for adopting a rule creating tipper and tippee liability in Dirks
should resolve the issue of whether to extend tipper/tippee liability to this
situation.233 Allowing tippers to achieve by indirection what is otherwise
illegal would make little sense.
To summarize, the correct holding in this first scenario would be to
find the tippee liable for an insider trading violation if the analysis is
based on the underlying statute and the facts presented. The tipper’s
behavior involved deception in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities and the tippee knew this. Reaching this conclusion did not
require investigating either the depth of the personal relationship between
the tipper and the tippee or the nature of the fiduciary duty breach by the
tipper. In fact, in this first scenario, it is unlikely that either a personal
benefit test (because they were distant friends) or a breach of a fiduciary
duty test (because the hacker did not have a fiduciary relationship with
the company) would lead to the correct conclusion that the tipper
wrongdoing should trigger insider trading liability.

231. See supra note 8.
232. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
233. In fact, the Solicitor General’s brief in the Salman case assumed that the Dirks opinion
had already addressed the issue of what would be required for a tipper’s actions to be sufficiently
in connection with a purchase or sale to trigger insider trading liability, stating that one of the
elements of the tipper’s wrongdoing in Dirks is that the tipper provides the tip “knowing or
expecting that the information will be used for securities trading. . . . The insider’s knowledge that
a tippee will ‘exploit[]’ the confidential information in trading is thus critical to finding securities
fraud.” Brief for the United States, supra note 178, at 23 (alteration in original). The heading of
this section of the brief states: “Dirks makes clear that the tipper’s understanding that the
information will be used for trading by a tippee is critical to liability.” Id. There is, however, no
explicit statement in either the Dirks or O’Hagan regarding the extent to which tippers beliefs
about whether the selectively disclosed information would be used for securities trading is
relevant to a finding of tipper wrongdoing.
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2. Company-Sanctioned Selective Disclosure
A second, more analytically challenging scenario involves an insider
at a public company making a selective disclosure of material nonpublic
information to a distant friend in violation of Regulation FD, but also
assuming the insider’s supervisor at the company sanctions the selective
disclosure. This scenario, as with the first scenario discussed above,
explores the tradeoffs between a multiple trigger approach, a personal
benefit test, and a fiduciary duty breach test for tipper wrongdoing.
In this scenario, let us assume the tipper is covered by the provisions
of Regulation FD. For example, the tipper might be an individual who
works at a public company in a position where she regularly
communicates with investors.234 Further, let us assume, as noted above,
this tipper’s supervisor instructed her to make this selective disclosure.
Finally, assume this tipper is fully aware that such selective disclosure
violates both Regulation FD and the firm’s stated policy against selective
disclosure of such information. This scenario is similar in some respects
to the facts in the Newman case, at least as understood by the Second
Circuit panel that decided the case.235
The question now becomes how to determine whether this tipper’s
sanctioned disclosure in violation of Regulation FD is sufficiently
wrongful to trigger insider trading liability. Under the personal benefit
test, a court would look to the nature of the relationship between the tipper
and the tippee, much as the panel in Newman did, even though the
relationship between the tipper and tippee in this scenario has little to do
with whether the tipper’s behavior was deceptive. For example, if the
tipper’s selective disclosure were to a close friend there might be clear
evidence of a personal benefit based on the Dirks standard, but whether
the conduct was deceptive would still remain an open question, because
the disclosure was sanctioned. Using a fiduciary duty test to determine
tipper wrongdoing in this scenario would require answering complicated
questions about how fiduciary duty law deals with situations in which a
principal’s instructions contradict either federal rules or guidance from
that principal’s ultimate principal.
The multiple trigger approach works much better, because it simply
requires making a determination of whether her behavior involved
deceptive conduct. This is the central issue that the personal benefit test
234. See supra text accompanying note 123. For a discussion of what makes a company
public, see Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite the
Rules that Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151, 152–53 (2013).
235. United States v. Newman, 733 F.3d 438, 455 (2d Cir. 2014) (“That is especially true
here, where the evidence showed that corporate insiders at Dell and NVIDIA regularly engaged
with analysts and routinely selectively disclosed the same type of information.”). The Newman
panel did not address the question of whether or to what extent this practice would violate
Regulation FD.
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or a fiduciary duty approach only addresses indirectly. So, is the tipper’s
behavior in this scenario deceptive? Clearly, yes. While the tipper may
not have deceived her immediate principal, the tipper deceived both the
ultimate principal, the firm, which has adopted a policy prohibiting such
behavior, and the federal government by violating a rule prohibiting this
type of selective disclosure. At least some degree of deception on her part
was necessary to carry out this selective disclosure.
These two scenarios, one involving a computer hacker and one
involving a sanctioned violation of Regulation FD, illustrate that neither
a personal benefit test nor a fiduciary duty test does a good job of
identifying situations in which a selective disclosure constitutes a
deceptive practice.236 After the enactment of Regulation FD and the
decision in O’Hagan, there is little justification for continuing to cabin
the analysis of the potential wrongfulness of a selective disclosure into
either a personal benefit test or a breach of fiduciary duty test.
Unfortunately, the Salman237 decision did not help advance the
analysis of when the selective disclosure of material nonpublic
information should trigger insider trading liability. In Salman, the tipper
wrongdoing involved all three of the wrongs that could plausibly be relied
upon as providing a sufficient basis for triggering insider trading liability.
There was deceptive conduct, a violation of company policy, and receipt
of the type of personal benefit specifically described in Dirks. The facts
of Salman allowed the Court to avoid addressing important questions
about when a selective disclosure should trigger insider trading liability
after the enactment of Regulation FD and the O’Hagan decision.238
CONCLUSION
This Article explains why the Court first introduced the rule in Dirks
that the selective disclosure of material nonpublic information can only
trigger insider trading liability if “the insider personally will benefit,
directly or indirectly, from his disclosure,”239 and shows that the various
rationales for adopting this rule no longer justify making evidence of a
personal benefit a necessary condition for identifying when a selective
236. The fiduciary duty aspects of insider trading jurisprudence have always had an uneasy
relationship with the statutory language that prohibits manipulative or deceptive practices. Nagy
uses the apt term of fiduciary “fictions” to describe the Supreme Court’s logic in certain insider
trading cases. Nagy, supra note 10, at 1337. One response on the part of lower courts and the SEC
to this mismatch is that as a descriptive matter, according to Nagy’s analysis, “a host of lower
courts and the SEC have in effect concluded that the offense of insider trading focuses on a
person’s wrongful use of confidential information, regardless of whether a fiduciary-like duty is
breached.” Id. at 1337.
237. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
238. See Guttentag, supra note 9.
239. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).
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disclosure involves deceptive conduct and triggers insider trading
liability.
In particular, the personal benefit test in Dirks: (1) no longer
establishes reliable objective criteria for determining when a selective
disclosure is wrongful, (2) can no longer be justified as necessary to allow
corporate communications which in 2017 would violate Regulation FD,
(3) does a poor job of preventing the circumvention of the insider trading
prohibition, and (4) does not reliably indicate the presence or absence of
deceptive conduct.240 There is little reason to continue to force federal
courts to try and resolve nettlesome questions about personal benefit and
fiduciary duty breach when the legal issues can be more easily and
directly resolved by looking directly to the relevant statutory language.
The personal benefit test as a necessary condition for finding tipper
wrongdoing should be acknowledged for what it is: a spandrel that might
be sufficient but is certainly no longer a necessary element for identifying
when a selective disclosure is sufficiently wrongful to violate the
Securities Exchange Act.241

240. See supra Section III.A.
241. For a more general discussion of spandrels, see S.J. Gould & R.C. Lewontin, The
Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist
Programme, 205 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y B. 581, 581–82 (1979).
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